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Abstract

This thesis examines the problem of election-related violence through a number of
meta-theories, which have recently emerged in the social sciences to explain intrastate conflicts. By using the case study of the 2002 elections in the Highlands
region of Papua New Guinea (PNG), this thesis examines the applicability and
usefulness of primordialism, modernization theory and weak state theory in
explaining election-related violence in PNG.

Critically examining the theories, the thesis analyses a wide range of information
about the historical, cultural, social and political factors that played a significant
role in the surfacing of election-related violence in the PNG Highlands. By
highlighting the dynamics between these various aspects, the thesis argues that
none of the existing theories has the capacity to fully conceptualize electionrelated violence in PNG.
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Introduction

On 16 September 1975, Papua New Guinea (PNG) became an independent
sovereign nation. It was within the 'third wave of democratisation' 1 (Huntington,
1991, p 24) that PNG, a former Australian colony, made a transition from a set of
hitherto acephalous (literally means headless) tribal societies towards a
modernising state governed by the principles of democracy. With the new
constitution, which was drafted by the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC),
PNG adapted a Westminster-style parliamentary system with a unicameral
parliament; 109 members from 89 Open electorates and 20 Regional electorates
(nineteen provinces and the National Capital District) are elected for five-year
terms by universal suffrage. National elections have been held since 19642 ; the
last election was held in 2002 (Reilly, 1999, p 226; May, 2003a, p 2; Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2007, online).

Papua New Guinea represents one of the few post-colonial developing nations
that has maintained an unbroken record

o~

democratic government since its

independence. It has held regular elections on schedule with a relatively high level
of participation and candidature. Changes of government have been peaceful and
have followed constitutional procedures. The judiciary has maintained its

1

The American and French Revolutions provided the impetus for the first democratic wave (18281926) that ended shortly after World War I. The second wave (1943-1962) was precipitated by the
struggle against fascism during World War II and the collapse of European colonialism in Africa
and Asia. The transition of former communist countries and Third World countries towards
democratic governance initiated the third wave of democratisation (1974-) that is still underway
(Huntington, 1991, pp 16-26; Handelman, 2003, pp 32-33).
2
During the colonial rule national elections were held for the House of Assembly in 1964, 1968
and 1972, which led to formal self-government in 1973 and independence in 1975 (May, 2004, p
129-132; Standish, 1994, p 57).

1

independence. There has been no military coup and there is a vibrant free press
(May, 2006a, p 151; Reilly,2002a, p 703).

Yet, despite these conventional indicators of democratic longevity that may
suggest political stability, the state of PNG not only remains weak, but it also
faces serious challenges as its political institutions have increasingly become
vulnerable to non-democratic pressures, including frequent turnover of
governments and national elections characterised by political unrest (May, 2003a,
p 1). Contrary to the opinion of some scholars 3, who tend to equate PNG's
unbroken record of democratic government with a democratic success, others
suggest that political development in PNG has resulted in 'political decay' owing
to a downward trend in maintaining democracy and its principles (Gelu, 2003, p
4). One of the most obvious manifestations of 'political decay' is the conduct of
national elections. Recent general elections have been marred by an increasing
level of violence and procedural malpractices. Election-related violence, which
some see as an 'accepted and necessary evil' of the political process (Ketan, 2000,
p 44, 48), raises the question about the pr~spects for the continuing health and
stability of democracy.

Election-related violence can be broadly defined as 'any acts of violence that are
intended to, or result in influencing electoral choices and electoral outcomes'
(O'Grady, Lopez-Pintor & Stevens, 2007, online). Fisher (2002, online) provides
a more specific definition. He defines election-related violence as "any random or

3

Reilly (1999, p 225) argues that "on many indicators of democratic performance, PNG is one of
the most successful democracies in the developing world". Similarly, Diamond (cited in Reilly,
2002a, p 704) claims that Papua New Guinea's "remarkably vibrant and resilient democratic
system" is" the most 'successful democracy of any of the 'Asian' developing countries".

2

organised act that seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral
process through threat, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical
assault, forced "protection", blackmail, destruction of property, or assassination".

Election-related violence in PNG, notably in the Highlands region, has become a
growing problem of order that challenges state authority and it represents a major
impediment towards consolidating democracy. Over the decades, elections have
become an arena of intense political competition not only for power, prestige, and
status, but also for the benefits of modernity offered by the state (May, 2006a, p
164). Individual candidates and their supporters often engage in violent clashes
and resort to illegal practices in an effort to influence the electoral choices of
voters and the outcome of elections in their favour, but also as a way to express
their grievances.

In the PNG Highlands, three types of election-related violence have been
identified: conflict occurs during campaigning, polling and post elections. Prepolling violence includes any form of vio~ent act, ranging from abusive verbal
exchanges to destruction of property and lives. Polling violence is partly the result
of the logistical disorganisation of elections and electoral malpractice by the state,
but much of the violence relates to interference with ballot boxes, and
intimidation of both voters and electoral officers by candidates and their
supporters. Post-polling conflicts are characterised by fighting between suppmters
of rival candidates and retributive violence, occasionally leading to full-scale
inter-group warfare (Dinnen, 2001, pp 162-169; Ketan, 2004, pp 284-288).

3

Although election-related violence became apparent during the 1980s (Strathern,
1993a, p 48), since the 1992 national elections it has intensified to such level that
there seems to be a tendency in scholarly discourse to talk of 'gun-point
democracy' (Standish, 1996), 'non-liberal democracy' (Gelu, 2000) and
'disorderly democracy' (May, 2003a). In 1997, the Electoral Commission
(PNGEC) reported that "the 1997 election was the most violent ever" (cited in
Gelu, 2000, p 106). Yet, worse was to come. In 2001, John Paska, PNG Trades
Union Congress general secretary, said "the general belief is that the 2002
election will bear witness to a degree of volatility never before experienced in
PNG" (National, 14 June 2001). As Paska predicted, the 2002 national elections
turned out to be the 'worst and darkest' in PNG's short democratic history (PostCourier, 02 August 2002). Although fighting was reported nationwide, election-

related violence became the most disturbing phenomenon in the five Highlands
provinces: Southern Highlands Province (SHP), Enga, Chimbu, Western
Highlands Province (WHP) and Eastern Highlands Province (EHP) 4 .

Threats, intimidation, violence, hijacking

~nd

destruction of ballot boxes and

hostage taking were characteristics of the 2002 Highlands elections. In Enga
province thirty armed men stormed the Wabag police station and dynamited ballot
boxes destroying thousands of ballot papers (Post-Courier, 12 July 2002, p 3;
'Tanim', 2003). In WHP a group of candidates made a plea to the GovernorGeneral to stop the poll before it sunk into a civil war (Post-Courier, 20 June
2002, p 1). Chimbu province was declared a 'fighting zone' (National, 28 June
2002, p 1), followed by SHP where elections had been so chaotic that for the first
4

See map on p, ix. Other areas such as Lae and Port Moresby also experienced some cases of
violence, although not to the extent as the Highlands.

4

time in the nation's history the Electoral Commission failed the elections in six
5

electorates and the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) had to be called out in an
effort to restore law and order (National, 10 July 2002, p 1; Post-Courier, 10 July
2002, p 1). The 2002 national elections in the Highlands, which by and large were
controlled under the barrel of the gun, claimed a number of casualties. Although
there are no exact figures, Standish (2003, p 143) estimates that the 2002 elections
in the Highlands claimed as many as 100 lives.

The snapshot of the 2002 national elections in the Highlands outlined above is to
be understood as part of a broader problem that confronts the PNG state. The
structural changes in PNG's administration and legal reforms during the colonial
era were inadequate and perhaps inappropriate as a means to 'modernise'
Highlands societies, which were governed by deep-rooted traditional values that
. are many thousands of years old. Despite the imposition of a Western model of
democracy, PNG remains characterised by a parochial political culture that is
largely driven by traditionalism. Clan solidarity and political patronage,
sometimes bordering on "kleptocracy" (K.etan, 2000, p 53), overrides all other
aspects of politics. What has emerged is a weak state that lacks legitimacy and
power to penetrate society, and the consequential lack of capacity to deliver goods
and services to the people. The manifestation of a weak state is economic decline
and societal malfunctioning that poses considerable challenges for the stability of
PNG.

5

The electorates concerned were Kagua-Erave Open, Tari Open, Komo-Magarima Open,
Imbonggu Open, Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open and Southern Highlands Provincial (Nonggorr,
2006, pp 7-8).
.

5

Documenting the extent of this challenge has proved elusive. However, the Fund
for Peace, an international research and educational organisation, has recently
produced an annual Failed States Index (FSI). The purpose of the FSI is to assess
countries against a set of indicators and determine whether or not they are failed
states. According to the Fund for Peace (2007, online), PNG scores high (84.6 out
of 120 points) on the FSI of 2006. This relatively high indicator of state failure
demonstrates that the PNG state is weak and it may have the potential to become a
failing or failed state (Tulkiewicz, 2006).

Internal conflict has been identified as one of the main reasons why nation-states
fail (Rotberg, 2003, p 1). Internal conflict that takes the form of tribal and clan
clashes are frequent in PNG and intensify during election times. Such internal
conflicts pose a great threat to PNG's already fragile stability. Therefore,
understanding the underlying causes of election-related conflict is crucial to
prevent PNG from deteriorating further. This is especially the case since,
throughout the 1990s, Western foreign policy makers have increasingly become
preoccupied with state-building assistance. to their non-Western counterparts in an
effort to avoid potential threats posed by weak and failing states 6 • Concerns about
security and development now predominantly focus on the central role of the state
and its ability to provide effective economic, social and political management
(Chandler, 2006, pp 2-5).

6

Failing and failed states are genet:ally acknowledged as posing severe security threats as they are
widely perceived as being the source of many of the world's most serious problems, from poverty
to AIDS to drugs to terrorism (Krasner & Pascual, 2005, p. 153; Fukuyama, 2004, pix).

6

Such a role has posed a significant challenge for Australia because PNG occupies
the crest of Australia's immediate north and east region which is described, albeit
contentiously, as an "emergent arc of instability" 7 (Rumley, Forbes & Griffin,
2006, p 1). Given its geographical proximity8, the country's stability is important
for Australia as well as the South Pacific region. In order to prevent PNG from
becoming a failed state, Australia provides PNG with approximately $300 million
in aid each year (AusAID, 2000, p 7). Aid programs focus on two main areas,
accelerating economic growth and fostering functioning and effective states
(AusAID, 2006, p 34, 42). Deteriorating law and order, however, has generally
been recognised as a major economic and social development constraint
(AusAID, 2003a, pp 11-12; Chand, 2003, online; World Bank, 2004, p 26; Morris
& Stewart, 2005, online). For the aid programs to be effective, it is important to

address and understand law and order problems, of which tribal conflict is a major
part.

The purpose of this honours thesis is to explore and analyse the broader problems
that underlie election-related violence in PNG. To do so, this thesis will attempt to
conceptualise election-related violence by using the 2002 Highlands election as a
case study. Owing to the complexity of the problem, a coherent analysis requires a
multi-theoretical approach with the capacity to examine both sociological and
political aspects of violence and the ways in which these aspects intertwine.

7

Rumley (2006, pp 17-18) contests the term "arc of instability". He argues that the concept, which
now appears in government reports and has been made popular by the media, is an
overgeneralisation and perhaps an exaggeration. He argues that the concept of "arc" is both an
unhealthy metaphor and an artificial construct because countries located in Australia's immediate
region are not equally unstable. Furthermore, he argues that "vulnerability" rather than
"instability" is a more appropriate expression.
8
See map on'p, ix. ·

7

Despite the fact that election-related violence is increasingly becoming a global
occurrence, especially in deyeloping nations 9, an integrated theoretical perspective
has yet to be fully advanced within the social sciences to comprehensively explain
it. Consequently, the analytical framework of this thesis is built upon two theories,
ethnic conflict and weak state theory. The study of four prominent social
scientists, Clifford Geertz, Robert H. Bates, Donald L. Horowitz and Robert I.
Rotberg, provides the basis of a multi-disciplinary and integrated explanation of
election-related violence.

Although, as the case study of PNG will show, these two theories occasionally
overlap, for the purpose of this thesis they will be applied separately. Whereas
ethnic conflict theory is used to explain the sociological aspects of violence, weak
state theory provides a template for establishing a link between institutional
deficiencies of the state and election-related violence. Although some scholars use
the term 'ethnic conflict' in relation to PNG 10 , it is important to note that electionrelated violence is not necessarily ethnic group conflictll. Nevertheless, in the
absence of an alternative theory specific t? PNG, ethnic conflict theory seems the
most appropriate sociological perspective.

9

Among countries scheduled for elections in 2002, 19 have experienced previous election
violence: The Gambia, Republic of Congo, Cambodia, Colombia; Zimbabwe, Chad, Armenia,
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Pakistan, Georgia, Haiti, Albania,
Guinea, Macedonia, Madagascar, and Ukraine (Fisher, 2002, online). This list, however, does not
include Papua New Guinea, which indicates that there are potentially more countries marred by
conflict during elections.
10
See Reilly (2000) 'Democracy, ethnic fragmentation, and internal conflict'.
11
Inter-group conflict in the Highlands occurs between candidates' support bases. Standish (2007,
pp 139-140) notes that often the vote bases of many candidates share a common culture and
language; hence they cannot be regarded as separate ethnic groups.

8

Ethnic conflict theory is a relatively new area within the social sciences that
emerged in the post-World War II era 12 . Ethnic conflict theory is, in fact, a mega
theory that draws extensively on existing perspectives of ethnic phenomena.
These existing theoretical perspectives include primordialism, modernisation,
class analysis and cultural pluralism (Horowitz, 2000, p 96; Conteh-Morgan,
2004, p 197). The lack of well-established social classes in PNG, especially the
apparent lack of the middle class, renders the task of analysing election-related
violence in terms of the economic interest of various social classes difficult.
Similarly, cultural pluralism cannot be applied to the analysis because Highlands'
societies do not exhibit wide cultural differences, as their value and belief patterns
conform to the broad Melanesian culture. Therefore, this thesis will only use two
aspects of ethnic conflict theory, primordialism and modernisation. These will be
combined with weak state theory to analyse the 2002 national elections in the
PNG Highlands.

The thesis is built from a variety of resources that include both primary and
secondary research materials. Secondary ~esources are used when examining
theoretical explanations and the socio-political, historical and cultural background
of PNG. Secondary resources include books and journal articles. Originally, the
impetus of this thesis was set by the book titled 'Australia's arc of instability: The
political and cultural dynamics of regional security' (2006) co-edited by Dennis
Rumley, Vivian Louis Forbes and Christopher Griffin. Some notable authors

12

The post-World War II period, particularly the ending of the Cold War era has witnessed a
dramatic shift in the nature of warfare. This shift was marked by the decline in interstate conflicts
and dramatic increase in conflicts within the state, which now make up more than 95 per cent of all
conflicts mostly in developing countries (Human Security Report, 2005, online). These intrastate
conflicts have come to be labelled as 'ethnic conflicts', which refers to inter-group conflicts within
·
the state.

9

whose work has shaped this thesis include Bill Standish, Sinclair Dinnen, Ron J.
May and Ben Reilly, who are all experts on various aspects of PNG.

Primary resources are used when referring to the 2002 national elections. Primary
resource materials include newspaper articles, published and unpublished
government reports. The newspaper articles, which were published in PNG in the
year of the election 2002, were compiled from three PNG newspapers, The
National, The Post-Courier and The Independent. Copies of The Post-Courier
were obtained from the National Library of Australia (Canberra). Copies of The
National and The Independent were kindly lent by Dr Bill Standish.

A comprehensive analysis of election-related violence requires a sound
understanding of PNG culture. As argued by Yin (2003, p 59) researchers need to
have a firm grasp about the issues being studied to be able to correctly collect and
analyse relevant data. Chahal and Daloz (2006, p 11) observe that political actions
are often influenced by cultural factors such as custom, values and beliefs
indicating the importance of taking cultur.al variables into account when
examining politics. It is also believed that "violence is understood best when it is
examined over a range of cultural settings, and in a full variety of social
institutions" (Riches, 1986, p vii). In an attempt to provide a comprehensive study
of election-related violence this thesis will also incorporate many insights made
available by Anthropology.

10

The main problem to be examined in the thesis is:
~

To what extent can election-related violence in PNG be explained
by using aspects of ethnic conflict theory and weak state theory?

This problem will be approached

~hrough

a set of four research questions:

1) What is the extent of conflict as a source of political
violence?
2) To what extent can primordialism and modernisation
explain the prevalence of election violence?
3) How does the weak capacity of the PNG state contribute to
election-related violence?
4) How does the case study of the 2002 national elections in
the Highlands contribute to an understanding of the need
for a synthesis of sociological, anthropological and political
theories?

This thesis is organised according to a linear-analytic structure, which is a
standard approach recommended for theses (Yin, 2003, pp. 152-153). This thesis
is divided into this introduction, three chapters, and a conclusion. The first chapter
provides a brief historical overview of tribal warfare and the way fighting has
translated into modem politics in the form of election-related violence. By using
the 2002 national election in the Highlands as a case study, sociological and
political aspects of election-related violence placed in a theoretical framework
will be examined in chapters two and three respectively. Findings and
recommendations in relation to the theories will be presented in the conclusion.

11

Chapter One:

History of warfare

"Fightinghas always been here. It's part of our life. Heh, heh.
Enga custom! It's a part of our life .
. . .it won't end. Fighting won't end.
Why? Because we are born with it. And we will die with it. It's our
custom."
(Cited in Dorney, 2002, p 121)

Ethnographic accounts have demonstrated that tribal warfare, an important sphere
of competition, has long been present in the PNG Highlands. Whereas tribal
fighting in traditional society was the outcome of disputes that predominantly
centred on the oft-cited trio of land, women and pigs, in modem society it has
increasingly become associated with state institutions such as elections. Elections
have become a new arena of competition whereby local groups or group of
individuals often engage in destructive military practices as a means to succeed or
exact revenge for defeat. Election-related violence, as one manifestation of
modem warfare is, in fact, an altered continuation of traditional practices.

To understand the circumstances from which election-related violence has
emerged, this chapter presents a brief historical overview of tribal warfare. The
chapter starts by explaining some essential information on the structure of society
and traditional leadership. It then provides a discussion on pre-colonial tribal
warfare, the resurgence of fighting at the end of the colonial era and its causes,
and the emergence of a new leadership and arena of competition brought about by
colonialism and modernisation.

12

The Highlands provinces comprised of loosely structured and acephalous
(stateless) societies charact~rised by a segmentary structure 13 , in which
individuals belong to progressively more inclusively named groups. According to
their size, the following social groupings can be distinguished: phratry, tribe, clan,
sub-clan, sub-sub-clan and lineages (Ketan, 1996, p 243). Tribes are the most
coherent and autonomous social and political formations that occupy or claim a
certain territory (Royal Anthropological Institute, 1951, p 66). Tribes can be subdivided into clans and can form a phratry with a tradition of common descent. In
certain areas, for example in Mount Hagen (WHP), tribes are the main political,
ceremonial and military units (Ketan, 1996, p 247). These functions, however, are
transferred to the clan level if the tribes are too big, as it is the case in Chimbu
where tribal groupings can number up to 5,000 people (Standish, 1992, p 28).
Clans are the fundamental social formations in which membership is usually
acquired through unilineal and patrilineal descent, although there are cases when
membership is based on cognatic descent

14

(Standish, 1992, pp 27-28; Ketan,

1996, p 244). Ideally, clans are exogamous (people marry from outside the group),
but in certain areas, for example, in the E~stern Highlands, endogamy (marriage
within the group) is largely accepted and practiced (Feil, 1987, pp 75-76).

Although pre-colonial societies had no overarching central authority or any form
of 'state', certain individuals of high prominence were bestowed with political and
social leadership roles. These men came to be known as 'big men'. The 'big men'
13

As opposed to a hierarchical political structure, segmentary political structures are characterised
by the principle of equality. Different segments at each level of society are equal and correspond to
one another (Eriksen, 2001, pp 163-164).
14
Generally speaking descent in the Highlands is agnatic (father-to-son). Whereas in patrilineal
descent system transmission of membership takes place through the male line, in cognatic systems
kin group membership can be acquired through both mother's and father's side (Eriksen, 2001, p
.
97).

13

theory was first put forward by Marshall Sahlins (1963), who contrasted a selfmade 'big men' leadership jn Melanesia with that of inherited chieftainship in
Polynesia. Sahlins identified a big man with a bourgeois entrepreneur, who could
manipulate his followers as well as wealth to obtain social credit and prestige.
Sahlins' s typology of big man was essentially based on meritocratic attributes. He
argued that the power of a big man was personal power that rested with him as a
person rather than with the position. Big man status was attained through
individual actions and skills such as magical powers, exceptional rhetorical skills,
fighting ability, generosity and loyalty (Sahlins, 1963, pp 206-208).

Sahlins's 'big man' model has received some criticism. In an influential paper,
Standish (1978), for example argued that in pre-colonial times not only
meritocratic factors but also a 'hereditary advantage' played a significant role in
attaining a leadership status (Standish, 1978, p 33). Such reconsideration suggests
that the position of a big man is not acquired solely through his personal actions
as proposed by Sahlins. Nevertheless, it is argued that leadership was more
usually achieved than inherited (Dinnen ~Thompson, 2004, p 2).

Additionally, Sahlins's model assessed leadership positions against a generalised
set of formula. However, research conducted in various areas points to different
types of leaders. In Western Highlands, big men were those who excelled in
economic transactions in ceremonial exchanges, possessed good financial
standing and great rhetorical skills and were generous (Ketan, 2004, pp 71-72). In
contrast, in the Eastern Highlands, where ceremonial exchanges were given less
emphasis and where tribal hostility permeated society, big men were aggressive

14

warriors (Feil, 1987, p 65). Among the Maring (Madang), big men were wealth
transactors and shamans, wl;10 possessed esoteric knowledge concerning fighting
(Rappaport, 1984, p 29). Therefore, it can be argued that traditional leadership
varied according to certain social customs and practices adopted in different areas.

Life in traditional Highlands' societies was to a large extent characterised by
intense competition and co-operation between groups. An important arena of
these corporate activities was warfare. Government records and missionary
recollections from early colonial encounters indicate a great level of belligerence
between groups that constantly engaged in warfare with the destruction of lives
and property (Standish, 1992, p 34). From the late 1950s ethnographers began
conducting research on New Guinea Highlands ":'arfare (Knauft, 1990, pp 265I

266). The reconstructive accounts made available by anthropologists substantiate
Andrew Strathern's claim (1977, p 135) that prior to the Australian
administration, warfare was so endemic in the PNG Highlands region that in fact
it was an expected part of a people's life.

Early ~xplanation of warfare has been made from a functional ecological
viewpoint. Mervyn Meggitt (1977), who conducted his research among the Mae
Enga, produced a classic study in relation to the social formations that entail
warfare. Meggitt distinguished four different types of fighting, warfare between
phratries, intraclan fighting, fighting between clans of one phratry and warfare
between clans of different phratries 15 . The intensity of fighting was regulated by
agnation. Intraclan fighting (between 'brothers') operated under strong constraints
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A phratry is a loose social organisation above the tribal level, and refers to an alliance of tribes.
Ketan (2004, p 107) .calls these groupings "coalition-style alliances", which are based on military
alliances. They started to form in the early 1970s to achieve specific goals.
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in an effort to prevent total warfare, but combat between clans of different
phratries (with increased segmentary distance between disputants) was
unrestrained, and consequently could result in all-out warfare (Meggitt, 1977, pp
16-43). Meggitt argued (1977, pp 10-14) that it was primarily the combination of
high population density and land shortage that prompted groups to fight. Violence
in this sense was a means to acquire land through eviction, but also a means to
protect a group's patrimonial estate.

The ecological perspective of warfare had, however, soon become a subject of
criticism. An empirical critique of land shortage explanations was compiled by
Paul Sillitoe (1977). By using available census data for some regions and
informants' statements collected by ethnographers, Sillitoe concluded that in
majority of the cases disputes between members of different political groups
rather than land shortage was the underlying cause of war. Sillitoe substantiated
his claim with findings which revealed that victors often did not occupy their
enemy's land due to fear of the latter's ancestor spirits. Sometimes, victors invited
their defeated counterparts back to occupy their homeland. Additionally, he
argueg that persistent warfare occurred in. areas of moderate population density
and abundant land supply (Sillitoe, 1977, pp 71-79).

While Sillitoe did not rule out the acquisition of land as an aim of warfare, he
shifted the argument by pointing to disputes between different parties as the
immediate cause of fighting. Although he did not specify, later research revealed
that in traditional times it was the oft-cited trio of land, pigs and women (wealth
items) over which disputes predominantly arose (McLeod, 2002, p 155; Yala,
2002, p 7). Disputes could be settled in peaceful and violent ways, both regarded
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as a legitimate response to grievances. Traditional methods of dispute settlement
subscribe to what McLeod (2002, p 143) calls a "sliding scale of justice". These
include negotiation, mediation, violent self-help, compensation, payback and
warfare. In PNG, compensation is the most popular method of addressing a
grievance with the primary purpose being restitution and reconciliation. If
compensation, which almost always preceded warfare, failed to alleviate
grievances, disputes escalated to tribal war (McLeod, 2002, pp 150, 155). Besides
unsuccessful dispute settlements, other factors such as the pride and dignity of the
group, the affirmation of male identity and the social history of group enmity also
played a significant role in resolving conflicts through violence (Standish, 1992, p
112; Ketan, 2004, p 160; McLeod, 2002, p 160).

Australian colonial governance did, at least for a period of time, successfully
change the atmosphere of hostility by suppressing tribal fighting. The Highlands
region was first explored in the early 1930s and its pacification started after 1945
(Strathern, 1993a, p 42). The establishment of law and order became the colonial
Administration's number one priority.

Ini~ially,

pacification had achieved its

desired effect as statistical data revealed a decrease in warfare (Gordon &
Meggitt, 1985, p 162). Several factors contributed to the fact that tribal fighting
became less frequent during the 1950s and 1960s. The belief that the newcomers
were ancestral spirits or "Sky People" (Strathern, 1977, p 137; Gordon & Meggitt,
1985, p 163) made white people superior, but it was rather the understanding of
the power of firearms and a desire for European objects that aided pacification. In
addition, there was

a strong tendency among certain local groups towards active

17

and willing cooperation in the establishment of peace (Gordon & Meggitt, 1985, p
164; Standish, 1992, p 38) ..

However, pacification did not last for a long time, as the 1970s witnessed a
resurgence of warfare. Tribal fighting reappeared in all five Highlands provinces
and became especially widespread in Chimbu, Western Highlands and Enga
(Strathern, 1977, p 135). The scale of fighting, believed to be greater than in precolonial times (Strathern, 1977, p 136), prompted the government to appoint
Phillip Paney to commission an inquiry to investigate tribal warfare in the
Highlands. By distinguishing between long-term and short-term causes of
fighting, the Paney report (1973) gave multiple reasons for the revival of warfare.
Among the immediate causes leading to fight were land, sorcery, killings, women
and pigs. Long-term determinants included kin-group loyalty and 'the need to
fight' as a result of social, economic and political uncertainties that imposed
pressure and created anxiety in the communities. However, the report emphasised
that the prime cause of increased lawlessness in the Highlands was the
ineffectiveness of introduced judicial and.administrative procedures dealing with
disputes (Paney Report, 1973, pp 4-18).

As the Paney repmt imglied, the social, economic and political changes brought
about by colonialism had altered traditional life in ways, which had consequences
for conflicts. Contact with Europeans resulted in a population increase due to
medical services, improvements in diet and possibly aspects of mission influence.
The increase in population contributed to demographic pressures as local groups
grew and land shortage became apparent. Land shortage was further intensified by
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the introduction of cash cropping. Increasing pressure on resources became
associated with heightened intergroup tension. Disputes over the ownership and
use of resources, in particular land and pigs, became frequent and were further
aggravated by the legalisation of liquor sale (Strathem, 1977, pp 140-143;
Meggitt, 1977, pp 162-163).

On the legal front, the introduction of a formal legal system staffed with poorly
trained and educated indigenous magistrates during the 1960s meant rigid and
lengthy procedures, which often produced dissatisfactory outcomes for disputants
(Gordon & Meggitt, 1985, pp 76-82). Additionally, legal processes adapted from
Australia did not take local customs and sanctions into consideration when
handing down decisions. The question of compensation, which was usually
Highlanders' most pressing requirement for settling disputes, was largely ignored
(Paney Report, 1973, p 6; Standish, 1973, p 15). As a result of an ineffective
judicial system, villagers preferred to resort to their traditional way of handling
disputes by returning to violence.

Besides the shortcomings of the legal system, inadequate police presence was also
a contributory factor in the revival and spread of violence. The Paney report
(1973, p 19) stressed that in rural areas the force was dangerously understaffed.
Similarly to the legal field, the police were also short of experienced and trained
officers and they lacked the basic equipment necessary for field operations
(Standish, 1973, p 14). Additionally, there was a lack of co-operation and

19

consultation between the police and the Division of District Administration
services

16

,

which further hindered effective operation (Paney Report, 1973, p 19).

While institutional weaknesses in state structures facilitated the resurgence of
tribal warfare, the adoption of firearms as technological innovations in the mid~
1980s have further intensified, and at the same time dramatically altered the
nature of fighting, especially in terms of the rules of engagement (Ketan, 2004, p
178). In pre-colonial times the primary tools of warfare were bows and arrows,
spears and axes. Today, fights are fought with a range of lethal weapons including
home-made guns, pistols, rifles and high-powered military weapons (McLeod,
2002, p 156). Whereas traditional tribal fighting was spectacular, required logistic
planning and was played-out in prepared positions on pre-arranged battlefields
according to certain constraints, contemporary warfare has become characterised
by raids and ambushes whereby combatants engage in indiscriminate killings
(Gordon & Meggitt, 1985, pp 153-154; Ketan, 2004, pp 182-183). The inevitable
result of such shift in warfare practices is a high number of fatalities and injuries
and a considerable destruction of property. Between 1988 and 1996 tribal warfare
in Enga province claimed more than 300 lives. The estimated death toll from
recent fighting in the Southern Highlands is also believed to be in the hundreds
(Dinnen & Thompson, 2004, p 7).

Another significant factor that has widened the scale of conflict was the
imposition of a Western political system grafted onto a highly competitive
Highlands political culture. While traditional causes of conflict remained intact,
16

Australian colonial. control was based on the work of the Division of District Administration,
which came under indigenous control in 1973 (Standish, 1973, p 12).
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new causes of conflict were propelled by contemporary politics (Y ala, 2000, p 7).
Political reforms initiated by the Australian administration served as the first steps
towards democratisation. In the 1960s and 1970s, the establishment of state
institutions, local government councils, provincial government and the national
government, opened another arena of competition. The newly established national
and provincial electorates encompassed many politically autonomous and
competitive clans in single representational units. During the years, elections have
become increasingly associated with warfare, as these groups came into
competition over issues, such as funds for economic development, which are
channelled through the new political system. The government came to be seen as
a "king of super clan" (Gordon & Meggitt, 1985, p 182).

Just as the introduction of guns had shaped the nature of fighting, elections also
impacted on the nature of warfare. Intensified competition during elections has
gradually begun breaking down group unity. Whereas co-operation between
alliances of clans and tribes was vital in pre-colonial times, clans of the same tribe
came to oppose each other during electio:q.s (Ketan, 2004, p 158). For example,
Strathern (1993b, 227) notes a considerable drift in the alliance between the
Minembi and Kombukla tribes (Western Highlands) during the 1993 by-elections.
The Minembi always helped its traditional ally the Kombukla to elect its member,
consequently expected reciprocity. During the 1993 by-election, however, the
Kombukla refused to support the new Minembi candidate, which angered the
Minembi tribesmen such that they threatened to make war against them. Not only
have traditional military alliances started drifting apart, but also the increasing
number of candidates contesting elections has stimulated intra-clan fighting.
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Moreover, the new political system contributed to the emergence of a new type of
leadership. Whereas traditional big manship was earned through honour and
reputation based on performance, modem leadership roles are gained either
through working for or in government. Today, money and guns are the two
significant factors that dominate the struggle for modem leadership. The "primacy
of politics" (Dinnen, 2001, p 170) has created a perception that substantial wealth
can be generated from being a politician. In return for the dispersal of state
resources, all politicians receive support and power from their respective tribes
and clans. In an effort to get their members elected, groups readily resort to the
use of firearms, which are supplied by those with political ambitions. As Gibbs
(2004, p 13) notes "We are witnessing new kinds of tribalism with a new type of
leader who has access to guns and the ability to open or obstruct access to money
and resources". These factors make politics a major source of conflict and
violence.

The imposition of a Western democratic model onto a traditional tribal society
generated a process whereby the 'modem: and the 'traditional' merged. Electionrelated violence, in effect, is another dimension of warfare that reflects the
continuity of traditional competitions. It is the product of and a response to the
forces of decolonisation and modernisation that brought along social and political
development, subsequently transforming historically entrenched tribal fighting
into a modem day warfare that intensifies during and after elections. It is the
intensification of electoral competition that provides the setting for electionrelated violence that reached its height during the 2002 national elections. As this
chapter has demonstrated there is interplay between the traditional forms of
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cultural and political violence. Accordingly, the analysis of election-related
violence demands both sociplogical and political approaches, which are discussed
in the following two chapters.
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Chapter Two:

Sociological explanations of election-related violence

"SHP (Southern Highlands Province) people have gone mad", said the opinion
page of The National (18 July 2002, p 8) referring to the extraordinary levels of
violence and disruption that eventually led to 'failed elections' being declared in
six of the nine electorates. Following the call for fresh elections in the Southern
Highlands (Post-Courier, 2 August 2002, p 2), a group of 'angry community
leaders' wrote a letter to Prime Minister, Sir Michael Somare. The content of the
letter (signed by all six leading candidates):
"I'm giving the Somare-led government until4.06pm tomorrow (today) to
declare the remaining seats .. .If we don't have a reply by 4.06 (close of
business) tomorrow, then the Southern Highlanders will be a republic
country ... More people will die. Roads will be blocked, more bridges will
be blown up ... There would be "unimaginable bloodshed" ... Each tribe is
armed to the teeth with all the modem military style weapons ... We're
bringing the nation to its knees."
(Post-Courier, 9 August 2002, p 2)

While the SHP provides an extreme example, it is an illustration of the tense
atmosphere that prevailed throughout the highlands provinces during the 2002
national elections.

A comprehensive analysis of violence within the electoral context requires the
examination of both sociological and political aspects of conflictual relationships.
The analytical focus of this chapter centres on the sociological explanations of
violence, which are divided into two contending views: primordialism and
modernisation. Whereas the primordial approach is based on emotive theories of
conflict and the psychological sources of identity, modernisation theories provide
a rational choice analysis (Conteh-Morgan, 2004, pp 197-199). To establish the
extent to which violence during elections in the PNG Highlands reflects these
24

differing views, this chapter uses the study of three prominent social scientists,
Clifford Geertz, Robert Bates and Donald Horowitz, as the basis of the analysis.

Table 1:
Summary of the argument of major theorists
Primordialism
Modernisation
By emphasising the strength and nonrational character of social ties, the
primordial approach explains why
people are so strongly attached to
their ethnic groups.
It focuses on the psychological
sources of identity, which motivate
group solidarity and violence.
In-group versus out-group orientation:
whereas intra-group relationships are
marked by favouritism, inter-group
relationships demonstrate hostility
and discrimination.

Geertz:

•

Ethnic identities are given
and flow from,cultural
identities.
The formation of civil state
strengthens primordial
sentiments.
The primacy of group
solidarity in public affairs.
Conflict results from intergroup competitions for
relative group worth.

•
•
•

Early modernisation theory

Later modernisation theory

Regarded the process of
modernisation as an
'evolutionary progression',
which was believed to transform
small-scale solitary societies into
large-scale and impersonal
societies.

By focusing on economic
motives, it provides a rational
analysis of ethnic group
behaviour; why and how people
can be galvanised into actions.

Modernisation would result in the
emergence of new social strata.

Explains conflict in material
terms. Conflict results from the
rational pursuit of the benefits of
the modern state.

Bates:
The most 'detribalised' strata,
educated elites in particular, would
lead people away from ethnic
affiliations.

•

Fading traditionalism would
eventually lead to the end of ethnic
competition, hence the
disappearance of ethnic conflict.

•

Ethnic identities are not
constant. They are
responsive to
innovations and
revitalisation.
Ethnic groups compete
for the benefits
generated by modernity.
In their pursuit for
power, elites organise
competitive groupings,
which take ethnic form .
Groups follow if their
demands for material
rewards are satisfied by
elites.

•

•

~

----------•
•

Horowitz:

Bates:

Bates:
0

It treats ethnic identities
natural and constant.
Whilst primordialism is
useful in explaining the
persistence of ethnic
identities, it does not
provide an adequate
discussion of the role of
political and economic
factors in shaping ethnic
identities.

Criticism

Criticism

Criticism

•

The process of
modernisation promotes
ethnic groups formations.
Ethnic competition
endures as modernisation
proceeds.

Horowitz:

•

Ethnic affiliations remain
strong in modernising
societies.

•

•
•

•

The undue focus on the
role of elite ambitions
results in insufficient
attention to the conflict
motives of non-elites.
It does not explain why
conflict occurs in less
modernised countries.
The realm of feelings,
rather than material
interests, provides a
complete explanation of
conflict motives of both
elites artd non-elites.
Inter-group competition
is driven by the desire
to obtain positive social
identity.
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Primordialism emphasises the strength and non-rational character of certain social
ties (Freeman, 1998, p 19). Clifford Geertz first proposed the application of
primordialism to post-colonialstates 17 • Geertz (1963, pp 109, 112-113) regarded a
primordial attachment as one that derived from cultural 'givens' (blood, language,
region, religion and custom). The 'givens', which were rooted in the non-rational
foundation of personality, provided the basis of group solidarity. Communities
based on primordial allegiances were characterised by a 'corporate sentiment of
oneness', which had a deeply abiding strength in the post-colonial state (Geertz,
1963, p 114). Geertz asserted that for many people in modernising societies, this
'corporate feeling of oneness' remained a legitimate authority and much of the
interest in public affairs took the form of an obsessive concern with the
relationship to one's tribe, region or sect. Geertz argued that it was the formation
of a civil state that stimulated primordial sentiments because it introduced a more
efficient mechanism for the production of power, which is generated by and
associated~~ern

political institutions, into society over which various

primordial groups fight (Geertz, 1963, pp 109-121). Geertz's analysis implies that
conflict in modernising societies arises from competition for relative group worth,
as to permit oneself to be ruled by other tribes is to submit to oppression and
degradation (Geertz, 1963, p 127).

17

The concept of primordialism was introduced in 1957 by American sociologist, Edward Shils,
who differentiated between societies based on individualism and rationalism and societies
characterised by communal solidarity. He argued that people had a 'primordial' attachment, which
involved strong emotional ties that arose from socialisation and a basic sociocultural need for a
sense of identity and belonging. Such attachments were to be found in families, primary groups
and tribal societies (Van Krieken, Smith, Habibis, McDonald, Haralambos & Holborn, 2000, p
519; Freeman, 1998, p 19).
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The primordial approach has attracted a number of critics, particularly from those
theorists who established a ~ink between modernisation and ethnicity.
Modernisation theorists challenge the primordial approach for treating ethnic
identities as constant and ancient, ignoring the fact that they might respond to
innovations and revitalisation. They see identity as malleable and circumstantial
and also take exception to the tendency to underemphasize the role of elite
manipulation (Bates, 1983, p 166; Freeman, 1998, pp 19-20; Conteh-Morgan,
2004, p 198)

18

•

As opposed to the primordial approach, modernisation theorists

have sought to develop rational explanations of conflict. A number of strands can
be identified within modernisation theory.

Early modernisation theorists regarded ethnic allegiance as a historical
anachronism oomed to disappear due to the forces of modernisation 19 . These
sociologists eq ated modernisation with an "evolutionary progression"
transforming s all and solitary communities into large and impersonal societies
(Freeman, 1998, p 17). They put forward the concept of 'detribalisation', by
which they meant that in the wake of urb~nisation and industrialisation the
"

emerging new social strata, the elite, would lead people away from kinship
affiliations (Horowitz, 2000, p 97). Essentially, it was an optimistic approach as
'detribalisation' asserted the disappearance of ethnicity, consequently putting an
end to inter-group fighting.

18

Geertz's analysis does not differentiate between the elite and non-elite in the modernising state.
By arguing that identities were not fluid and shapeless, but clearly demarcated, and 'the network of
primordial alliances and opposition' was the product of centuries of gradual crystallisation, Geertz
had a tendency to treat identities as static (Geertz, 1963, pp 118-119).
19
See Gupta (1978, p 34), who argued that tribalism, an impediment to modernisation, would be
"gradually and cautiously eroded" by economic and political development.
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A later modernisation theorist, Robert Bates, refuted the idea that ethnic
competition would disappe(:lr and instead he argued, "ethnic groups persist largely
because of their capacity to extract goods and services from the modern sector and
thereby satisfy the demands of their members" (Bates, 1983, p 161). Whilst Bates
accepted Geertz's argument about the persistence of primordial sentiments, he did
not believe in emotive explanations of conflict. According to Bates, conflict
between groups derives above all from the competition over the benefits of
modernisation, power and control over the distribution and allocation of
resources. Bates argued that in the competition for power, elites manipulated
ethnic identities in order to generate the support of their groups. Bates, however,
did not explain conflict solely in terms of elite aspirations, but also of communal
aspirations. He arguld that groups placed considerable social pressure on elites, as
they only provided t~eir support as long as their demands for the benefits of
modern state was satisfied by their elected member (Bates, 1983, pp 161-166).
This perspective provides a different view from those of earlier theorists. In
contrast to early modernisation theorists, later modernisation theory emphasised
the importance of ethnic groups in mode~ising societies. In contrast to the
primordial approach, this approach sought to explain conflict in material terms.

Based on the range of existing theories, Donald Horowitz, a prominent political
scientist, developed a paradigm of ethnic conflict. By examining theories of
modernisation, Horowitz (2000, pp 102-105) concludes that modernisation theory
is insufficient in explaining how ethnic diversity relates to political instability.
Horowitz's criticism of modernisation theory is threefold. Firstly, he argues that
contrary to the predictions of early optimists ethnic affiliations remain strong
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(Horowitz, 2000, p 97). Secondly, Horowitz (2000, p 102) argues that
modernisation theory unduly focuses on the role of modem elite ambitions, hence
ignoring the conflict motives of non-elites. Thirdly, Horowitz (2000, pp 102-103)
claims that the theory does not provide a convincing explanation as to why
conflict occurs in the least modernised parts of the world. Whereas modernisation
theorists focus on the economic motives in explaining conflict, Horowitz, along
with Geertz, places more emphasis on self-affirmation. Horowitz (2000, p 146)
asserts that inter-group competition is driven by a group drive to obtain positive
social identity by competition and comparison with other groups. It is the fear of
being dominated or suppressed that provides the rationale for group hostility
(Horowitz, 2000, p 179).

A brief examination of these th)oretical foundations of conflict reveals a lack of
consensus in the field of social sciences as to what exactly ignites conflict. Whilst
these theories have strong potential to highlight certain aspects of conflict
motives, none of them is powerful enough to provide a comprehensive
explanation of conflict on its own. The e~amination of conflict in PNG Highlands
"

where kinship affiliations and group solidarity are still prominent features of
social existence, and where groups engage in volatile conflicts in order to gain
access to the benefits of the modem state, cannot be confined to one approach; it
requires a multi-layered sociological explanation. Consequently, PNG election
violence has lacked a comprehensive theoretical analysis. In an attempt to
conceptualise election violence, this chapter will examine the applicability and
usefulness of the primordial approach and modernisation theories.
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PNG was colonised by Great Britain and Germany in 1884. While Australia took
over the responsibility of British Administration in 1906, and that of the German
part in 1914 (Dorney, 1990, pp 38-39), given its geographical remoteness, the
Highlands region was the last to be explored by the Australian Administration in
the early 1930s. In fact, the PNG Highlands was the last contacted large tribal
population on earth (Knauft, 1990, p 265). From the mid 1940s onwards
Highlanders had experienced a dramatic pace of change and political and
economic development driven first by cash cropping and plantation economy and
later by the establishment of political institutions. Political education of people
about Western democracy started in the late 1950s. Although the first local
government councils in the HighlandJwere established in the 1960s, state
institutions have been fully in place o/ ly since PNG gained independence in 1975
(Gordon & Meggitt, 1985, pp 92-98; Strathern, 1993a, p 42).

As previously noted, early modernisation theorists predicted that social changes
would bring about the demise of ethnic groupings. However, the introduction of
Highlands' societies to the modern econowy and western-style political system
did not result in a "detribalised" society (Horowitz, 2000, p 97). Instead of
destroying "communal particularism" (Melson & Wolpe, 1971, p 2), social
mobilization of the Highlands region has resulted in what Strathern (1993a, p 48)
calls "the process of neotribalisation". Neotribalisation is a manifestation of
modern politics in Melanesia which, in the absence of basic social divisions and a
strong party system, is essentially based around personal and group identities
(May, 2004, p 45). ·
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The traditional fragmentation of Highlands' societies means that political
activities at both local and national level have rema~ned organised along
traditional structural lines: clans and tribes ranging from 1,500 to 10,000 people
(Ketan, 1996, p 249; Standish, 2007, p 140). As a consequence, elections are
competitions between clans and sometimes tribes. Electoral behaviours subscribe
to the 'parochial handout mentality model' (Saffu, 1996, p 4) as electors,
especially in the Highlands, often cast their votes along clan lines (May, 2006b, p
108). Such voting behaviour reflects the imperative of clan loyalty. Most PNG
people retain a primary attachment ~nd loyalty to their clan or tribal group, a
phenomenon known as wantokism 20 E~tandish, 1994, p 60).

Whilst group solidarity and clan voting reflects Geertz' argument about
primordial attachments in modernising societies, the concept of primordial has to
be handled cautiously in the Highlands context. Geertz (1963, p 119) maintained
that primordial alliances and oppositions were static, as they had been crystallised
over centuries. In the Highlands, however, alliances are rather fluid, shifting in
nature as they are created through militarr alliances, intermarriage and ceremonial
exchanges. Ketan (2004, pp 255-261) calls these inter-group relations, which
develop over the years with the primary purpose of being used during elections,
'the Hagen mega-cycle' 21 . What is important for the purpose of the analysis of
primordial attachments is the extent of group solidarity and subjective aspects of a
group-related feeling of identity.

20

Wantok means 'one talk', the Tokpisisn world for people who speak the same language
(Standish, 1994, p 60).
21
Joseph Ketan, a Papua New Guinean anthropologist, has done his research in the Mount Hagen
area in Western Highlands Province, hence the name of Hagen mega-cycle.
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Local issues and identities have a primacy in Highlands politics. Group members
take great pride in nominating one of their members as a candidate (Standish,
2007, p 141). According to Ketan (2004, p 130), the 'name-must-not-go-down'
principle is of supreme importance in the composition, solidarity and continuity of
Hagen groups. The significance of primordial factors is manifested through
localised support for elections as mobilization is usually organised in the name of
the group. The ideology of group solidarity is often expressed through bloc voting
as an indicator of the 'corporate feeling of oneness' (Geertz, 1963, p 120) and also
the often jealous protection of a candidate's base vote area.

Clans often deliver their votes en bloc in order to secure the candidacy of their big
men (Standish, 1989, p 165), consequently enhancing their group's prestigious
standing vis-a-vis other clans. Such corporate activity reflects the desire for
relative group worth as argued by both Geertz (1963) and Horowitz (2000).
Standish (2002, online) observed that during the 2002 national elections Chimbu
people had presented over 90 per cent voting solidarity at ballot boxes 22 . One
way of expressing group solidarity is

call~ng

out the candidate's name loudly.

This way, voters prove their loyalty to the group by demonstrating that they vote
according to the tribal deal ('Pigs and Politics', 2002; Gibbs, 2004, p 11). Another
method of clan voting is known as 'turning the table' 23 , which means that the

22

This figure, however, does not necessarily reflect the genuine strength of clan solidarity as
candidates often resort to coercive practices to secure their votes. This will be discussed later in
this chapter.
23
InEnga, turning th,e table has acquired the name 'tanim tebol', a Tokpisin expression, which
means that all votes go one way (AusAID, 2003b, p 21).
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table, in fact, is turned over and all ballot papers are filled out for one candidate
by his representative(s) 24 (A.usAID, 2003b, p 21).

According to an AusAID (2003b, p 21) report, "detailed statements of facts" have
emerged that during the 2002 national elections officials were often coerced into
allowing the mass-marking of ballot papers. In WHP, for example, a presiding
officer was forced by armed supporters of a candidate to drive to a secluded area
where he was ordered to sign the ballot papers (Post-Courier, 21 June 2002, p 1).
Although the hijacking of ballot papers and the intimidation of polling officials
are violence against the state, they reflect the desperate desire of the group to
enhance the chance for their candidate to win, as his election to parliament gives a
superior status to the group. Violence in this sense can be interpreted as a means
to achieve positive social identity (Horowitz, 2000).

There are occasions, however, when presiding officers readily approve the
tampered ballot papers as authentic, as it was the case for one of the candidates in
Sinasina-Yonggamugl Open seat25 (Chimbu province) (ABC TV, 'Foreign
Correspondent', 2002):

" .... Okay ... You guys relax and do your work.
We are trying to send somebody to the National Parliament. ..
Yes, Sir.
However you do it. . .it doesn't matter. Just do it!
Thank you very much! Thank you, Boss."

24

This was the case in Enga for the provincial election. The son of Peter Ipatas (sitting Governor)
was mass-marking ballot papers in front of the camera ('Tanim', 2003).
25
This conversation was recorded by human rights activist, Robyn Slarke, while supporters of
Peter Iggy Kalale were mass-marking ballot papers with the encouragement of the presiding
officer. Peter' Iggy Kalale lost the election.
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The mass-marking of ballot papers with the approval of the presiding officer
occurs pmticularly when the official is a member of the clan. Such official
behaviour reinforces Geertz's (1963) claim that kinship affiliations in
modernising societies have primacy over the state.

Another aspect of primordialism expressed by block voting practices relates to the
issue of territoriality, which has a psychological underpinning. To defend the
group's territory from enemies means to defend the collective identity. In the
Highlands, supporters and candidates are jealous and highly protective of their
base-vote area from other candidates. In 2002, it was almost impossible and also
dangerous for candidates to campaign in their rivals' base areas (Standish, 2002,
online; 'Pigs and Politics', 2002). Groups set up roadblocks in an effort to prevent
rival groups from poaching votes in their territory. Supporters of rival candidates
often resort to fighting at roadblocks resulting in injuries, destruction of property,
vehicles in particular, or occasionally destruction of lives. In SHP, one of the
candidates, Peter O'Neill, and his supporters, numbering about 1,000, were
attacked and stoned by about 300 supporters of a rival candidate. The attack
resulted in 25 injuries and two vehicles being badly damaged (National, 11 June
2002, p 7).

Another form of deterrent tactic employed by traditional tribal enemies to protect
their base-votes is the kidnapping of a rival candidate (Dinnen, 2001, p 162;
Ketan, 2004, p 250). In 2002, such a hostage-taking saga was reported in KorobaLake Kopiago district (SHP) during the campaign period. Ben Peri, a Duna
candidate, attempted to campaign with a police escort in the HuH-speaking
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Koroba District, which was the base area of his rival, Herowa Agiwa 26 . During his
campaign a gunfight broke out, one policeman was killed and two others injured.
Ben Peri and another two policemen were taken hostage (Post-Courier, 20 May
2002, p 1); A few days after the kidnapping took place, the former sitting member
of Koroba district, Herowa Agiwa, admitted that some of those holding the three
hostages were his supporters (Post-Courier, 22 May 2002, p 1). Allegedly, it was
Mr Agiwa who had arranged the hostage-taking (Haley, 2004, p 19).

The primordial approach assumes in-group cooperation and out-group hostility
(Conteh-Morgan, 2004, p 199). In the Highlands, however, this dichotomy does
not always hold strong. In keeping with the fluidity and shifting allegiances of
Melanesian politics27 , violence occurs not only between groups, but within groups
as well. Standish (2007, p 141) argues that in the last decade group unity has been
breaking down as more and more candidates stand, consequently splitting the tribe
or even the clan base vote. Such splits contribute to serious fighting. In 2002, the
polling for the Sambeoko clan at Par, where two candidates contested the
Kombiam I Amburn Open seat (Enga),

e~ded

in the death of two men and a tribal

fight that lasted four months after the elections claiming another 16 lives
('Tanim', 2003; Lakane & Gibbs, 2003, p 109; Gibbs, 2004, p 6). A similar
incident occurred in Kundiawa (Chimbu) where a fight erupted between
26

Koroba-Lake Kopiago district is the home of four different ethnic groups, the Huli, the Duna,
the Rewa and the Bogaia. The Koroba seat has been held by a Huli since 1982. Koroba, which is
the Huli part of the district has always been more developed than Lake-Kopiago, the Duna
speaking area. Disparities between different parts of the district are a source of discontent and
explain the long-standing tension between the Duna and the Huli (Haley, 2004, p 16-17).
27
As previously noted in this chapter (p 31), Highlands groups are fluid and shifting in nature.
They are characterised.as much by unity as by factionalism, which has always been part of
traditional Melanesian politics. Tribes, and sometimes clans, form alliances, which are temporary
and ad hoc. Groups within the alliance often co-operate in the drive to attain a specific goal. Whilst
such co-operation bring along high level of unity within and between groups, group unity can be
threatened by disruptive power struggles that exist between leaders of different factions (Ketan,
2004, p 108).
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supporters of two candidates, both from the Kamanegu tribe. Many people had
been killed and many had b~come refugees as the result of the conflict, which was
still under way weeks after the elections (Dika, 2003, p 44-45). Modernisation in
post-colonial societies strengthens primordial attachments, but at the same time it
also has the potential for breaking down 'the corporate feeling of oneness'.

The importance of group identity, a sense of common solidarity and the
attachment to a specific territory reinforce the prevalence and endurance of
primordial attachments in post-colonial Highlands societies as argued by Geertz
(1963). Similarly, effmts made to maximise votes are indicators of the group's
desire to attain positive social identity as promoted by Horowitz (2000). However,
political competition to gain access to the modem state also implies that conflict
revolves

arou~d

the desired components of modernity as much as they revolve

around identity. Geertz's application of primordial attachments to post-colonial
states draws no attention either to the material expectations of groups or to the
role of elites 28 in the mobilization and manipulation of collective identities. These
issues, which play an equally prominent r~le in the electoral context, provide the
starting point of modernisation theory.

Clan mobilization of candidates, rather than party loyalties or policies, has been
widely documented as one of the most established features of electoral strategies
in the Highlands (Saffu, 1996; Standish, 1996; Dinnen, 2001; Morgan, 2005). The
primary preoccupation of candidates during electioneering is to secure votes from

28

The term elite must be used fairly loosely in PNG, where leadership status is relatively
permeable fo'r men of ambition (Claxton, 2000, p 267).
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their natal clan, in-laws and matrikin29 • The importance of kin ties as the basis for
the mobilization of electoral support as expressed by one of the candidates during
the 2002 elections ('Pigs and politics', 2002):

"Up in the Highlands, we live in the tribal system- once your tribe is with
you, that's it. It's not your political party or whatever. So that grouping
that came across was not from my tribe, it's a different tribe. They got
different blood. They have got their own candidate standing .... "
(Peter Waieng, sitting member for Kundiawa)

Bates (1983, p 161) argued that in the competition for power and prestige, elites
stimulate the formation of ethnic groups. The politics of patronage through
distributive activities, called 'Big Man politics' ('Pigs and Politics', 2002) reflects
Bates's argument. Distributive activities are the primary means for candidates to
mobilise and secure their local base. Such activities involve providing access to
state resources in the form of development funds, commonly known as 'slushfunds', projects as well as employment, education and travel to one's kin group
(Morgan, 2005, p 4).

These' distributive activities are part of the Melanesian tradition, which greatly
influenced the ideology of contemporary politics. Despite the fact that patronage
politics is played out with resources of the modern state, it is not a modern
phenomenon. It has its origin in traditional Highlands societies. Traditional
societies were predominantly redistributive societies governed by the principle of
reciprocity (Gordon & Meggitt, 1985, p 156). Reciprocity is deeply embedded in
Highlanders' cultural mores; a gift incurs an obligation to be repaid at a later
29

This observation was made by Standish (2002, online) in Chimbu province for candidates who
campaigned for Open seats during the 2002 elections.
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stage, simultaneously it opens a continuing exchange relationship (Standish, 1983,
p 108).

As Dinnen points out (2001, p 175), electoral strategies employed by
contemporary politicians bear similarities to those of Melanesian Big Men. Just as
traditional big men secured popular approval of their power by establishing their
monopoly over redistributive resources (Gordon & Meggitt, 1985, p 157), in
contemporary societies, politicians convert their representative roles into one of
patronage as a means of building prestige and engendering social debts from the
electors.

As mentioned earlier, people often cast their votes along clan lines. While such
corporate voting behaviour means a high level of group solidarity, it also indicates
the groups' desire to gain the benefits of the modern state for their respective
members. Whole clans promise their votes for one candidate, but in return for the
votes delivered, elites are expected to distribute patronage in the form of schools,
roads, electricity etc for their local power base ('Tanim', 2003). On the one hand,
high material expectations of voters reinforce Bates's theory, which argued that
groups placed considerable social pressure on their elites (Bates, 1983, p 162). On
the other hand, they run counter to Horowitz's criticism (2000, p 104) of the
assumption that non-elites follow if there is a pay-off.

Additionally, Bates (1983, p 162-163) argued that groups have the capacity to
withdraw their elites' status if they fail to satisfy their demand for material
resources. The high expectations from contemporary leaders, which again are
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similar to those held by traditional big men (Dinnen, 2001, p 174), is reflected by
the high turnover rate of M~mbers of Parliament (MPs). MPs. who do not deliver
goods and services to their 'constituency' are not getting re-elected

(R~illy,

2002b, p 25; Dorney, 2002, p 117-119) 30 • The high turnover of MPs substantiates
Bates's argument about social pressure placed on elites. Moreover, it indicates
that people follow their leaders if there is a pay-off, or to be more precise, they do
not follow if there is no pay-off, hence the validity of modernisation theory as
opposed to Horowitz' criticism of it.

Although Bates (1983, p 161) argued that "the main reason for conflicts is that in
the competition for power, ethnic appeals are useful to politicians", he did not
attribute conflicts solely to the aspiration of elites, but also to communal
aspiration for the components of modernity (Bates, 1983, p 153). Communal
aspiration is to be understood against the backdrop of social mobilization. Having
been mobilized into the modem economy and polity, groups came to desire the
benefits generated. They want to have more goods, more recognition and more
power (Melson & Wolpe, 1971, p 5). Ho'Yever, the valued goods represented by
"

modernity are scarce in proportion to the demand for them. The imbalance
between demands and supply inevitably results in competition (Melson & Wolpe,
1971, p 6; Bates, 1983, p 153).

Political competition in the Highlands is intense as membership in Parliament
provides access to sectoral allowances and funds. Although these funds are made

30

At each election over half the parliamentary members lose their seats. For example, during the
1997 election, only 55 incumbent politicians were able to retain their seats (May, 2002, p 13). In
2002, the number ofMPs losing a seat reached its peak, the figure totalled an extraordinary 83 of
106 (Standish, 2003, p 146).
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available for politicians for direct distribution in their electorates, in reality, they
only serve two purposes. Or1 the one hand, they are used for self-advancement. On
the other hand, they are often politicised to shore up political support, to reward
followers, and to secure votes for re-election (Dinnen, 1996, p 83; Stewart &
Strathern, 2002, p 79). As a consequence, political competition is being reduced to
a zero-sum game as only the politician and his local base enjoy the benefits of
modernity. The remaining part of the electorate, however, has equal demand for
goods and services, hence the fractionalisation between groups within the same
electorate (Strathern, 1993a, p 46). The source of the conflict lies in the imbalance
in the distribution of goods and services, which is the consequence of elites'
ambition for power.

The imbalance in the distribution of modernity is a source of jealousy, frustration
and anger for the remaining part of their electorates. Those who are left out may
perceive themselves as being treated like "enemies" (Stewart & Strathern, 2002, p
79). During the 2002 elections, member of the Anglimp I South Waghi electorate
(WHP), Kuk Kuli, was attacked by Minj people. It is alleged that Mr Kuli was
c

attacked because he had only provided services for his own supporters, neglecting
the rest of the district (Post-Courier, 16 April2002, p 1)31 . A few days later, Mr
Kuli's supporters retaliated (Post-courier, 18 April 2002, p 2). Their attack
indicates that the Minj people, in fact, were considered as enemy.

With respect to elite ambitions for power, Bates's theory explains that elites
mobilise support of their ethnic groups. Bates, however, did not make any
31

MP Kuk Kuli later.resigned in order to avoid tribunal charges for misappropriating Kl75,540
that belonged to the National Gaming Board (Post-Courier, 30 April 2002, p 2).
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reference to the possibility that in the quest for power and prestige, the elite may
or can resort to violence against its members, as was the case in the Highlands.
Patronage politics discussed earlier is not the only strategy for soliciting electoral
support. In their competition for "super-big-man status" (Ketan, 2004, p 244),
many candidates resort to vote-buying practices, which can trigger retaliation, as
well as to intimidation of voters. In these cases, violence is the product of elite
ambitions directed at members of the group.

The "commoditization of voting process" (Strathern, 1993a, p 48) by giving out
cash directly to the people became a widely used practice in all Highlands
provinces during the 2002 elections 32 . Desperate candidates were prepared to go
to the polling stations with hard cash in their hands to entice voters (Independent,
13 June 2002, p 2). It seemed that candidates were pursuing voters, rather than the
reverse (Post-Cou,rier, 19 June 2002, p 11).

Cash-for-votes also have its origins in traditional practices and it is also based on
the principle of reciprocity. Whereas in tr~ditional societies big men tried to outdo
each other with the size of their pigs and gifts, in contemporary societies
candidates try to outdo each other with cash in election campaigns (Ketan, 2004, p
244). Candidates "invest or gamble" (Post-Courier, 6 June 2002, p 5) a huge
amount of money during campaigning in the hope that their 'generosity' will be
reciprocated with votes. Practice, however, deviates from ideology, as individuals
do not always support those candidates who have given out cash. The imbalance
in reciprocity, when cash is not reciprocated with votes, contributes to various
32

'Vote-buying' is not a new phenomenon. Standish documented the practice of "doing a little bit
of bribery around anq about" during the 1977 national elections in Chimbu province ( 1983, p 108109).
.
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forms of retribution such as murder, rape, injury to person and destruction of
property by disgruntled and losing candidates and their supporters after polling
(Ketan, 2004, p 246).

Another consequence of large sums of money distributed during campaigning is
that some candidates seek to enforce the solidarity of their clan people. While
group voting is a characteristic electoral behaviour in the Highlands, to measure
the extent to which voting in solidarity is genuine seems to be difficult in an
environment where voters are intimidated at gunpoint and coerced to vote
according to 'the right way' (Standish, 1996, p 299-300). According to Singirok33
(2005, p 2), during the 2002 elections both candidates and incumbents were
prepared to use firearms as a means to harass, intimidate and threaten voters in
order to secure their votes. Such electoral behaviour of candidates in the
Highlands, especially in SHP, Enga and WHP, has resulted in what some call as
"Afghanistan-type" elections (Post-Courier, 26 July 2002, pp 1-2) and also has
contributed to the emergence of 'warlordism' (National, 2 July 2002, p 9; 'Foreign
Correspondent', 2002).

In the electoral context, it is the combination of the two theoretical approaches
that best explains inter-group conflicts in the Highlands. Whereas Geertz's
argument about primordial attachment within the modernising state is useful in
highlighting the importance of collective identity, Bates's theory provides
powerful explanations as to why and how political competition can contribute to
conflict between groups in the Highlands region. Additionally, it can be argued
33

Jerry Singirok is a .retired Major-General and former commander of the Papua New Guinea
Defence Force.
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that Horowitz's criticism (2000, pp 102-103) of modernisation theories falls short.
Bates did not explain conflict from an elitist perspective, but rather from the
mixture of elite ambitions to power and communal desire to gain access to the
benefits of the modern state. It is exactly this desire to extract goods and services
from the state that partly explains election-related violence in the Highlands,
which is one of the least developed regions in the world. Nonetheless, there are
areas of election-related violence that neither of the theories can fully explain due
to their strong focus on inter-group relations.

This chapter has demonstrated that sociological theories, primordialism and
modernisation theory, have their strengths and shortcomings in explaining
election-related violence in the Highlands societies. Conflicts in the Highlands
region exhibit a number of features. They can be driven by sentiments or I and
material expectations, but they can also be the outcome of institutional
constraints. A comprehensive examination of election-related violence, therefore,
requires the incorporation of the capacity of the state into the analysis.
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Chapter three:

An examination of the political aspects of violence

Societies divided along ethnic cleavages tend to produce party systems that
exacerbate conflict (Horowitz, 2000, p 291). Horowitz (2000, p 306) argues that
ethnic parties and ethnic party systems are the building blocks of party politics in
ethnically divided societies. Ethnic parties mobilize their support from an
identifiable ethnic group and serve the interests of that group. Contrary to a broad
based party system that aims to serve the public at large, ethnic parties only
identify narrow group interest. In the competition for state power, ethnic groups
seek to exclude other groups from power. Conflict results from the incompatibility
of ethnic claims to power (Horowitz, 2000, pp 291-297).

In contrast to Horowitz's claim, conflict in PNG, which is the most ethnically
fragmented society in the world (Reilly, 2000, p 163), does not result from the
competition of ethnic groups for power. Ethnicity in PNG has not posed the
divisive threat that it has in many developing countries. Although PNG' s ethnic
divisions may be a source of local

conflic~s,

the extreme fragmentation of the

country and the absence of any large ethnic group have meant that no ethnic or
linguistic group is big enough to monopolise power at the national level (Reilly,
2000, p 178, May, 2003b, p 163). Additionally, the apparent weakness of PNG's
party politics reflects the difficulty that parties face in organising a strong support
base to achieve political aims.

These realities were demonstrated during the 2002 national elections. A week
before the people of PNG went to the poll to cast their votes, Sir Mekere Morauta,
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then Prime Minister, urged voters to choose candidates on their merits instead of
their party affiliations (Nat~onal, 7 June 2002, p 5). Sir Mekere said "parties have
no blood, eyes and nose, forget the parties but the people in the party" (PostCourier, 7 Jun~ 2002, p 4). Sir Mekere's statement indicates that political parties
in PNG matter little as a factor in choosing qndidates.

Party politics in PNG bears little relationship to the classic Westminster two-party
model, which is believed to be the cornerstone of democracy (Powell, 1982, p 7).
Politics in PNG is characterised by a diffuse and fragmented party system. Never
in PNG's history was the party system as fragmented as it was in 2002, when a
record-breaking 43 political parties registered for the national elections (National,
1 May 2002, p 7). Among the 24 parties that won seats in the national legislature
(PNGEC, 2006, online), 12 parties are now representing the Highlands region 34 .

In addition to the high level of fragmentation of the party system, political parties
in PNG are organisationally weak, lack a mass base and have no ideological
affiliations 35 (May, 2004, pp 136-137; Reilly, 2002a, p 706). Contrary to
Horowitz's claim, parties in PNG do not function as representatives of a particular
ethnic group 36 , but rather as "aggregative groupings" from which parliamentary
coalitions are built (Reilly, 1999, p 231). Parliamentary coalitions are unstable
owing to the inherent weakness of the PNG party system that up until 2002

34

See Appendix A and Appendix B for parties.
The lack of ideological differences among the parties was apparent during the 2002 election
campaigns. They all emphasised general themes such as the importance of economic development,
delivery of government services, especially health and education, to rural areas, good governance
and an end to corruption.
36
The three biggest parties, National Alliance, People's Democratic Movement and People's
Progress Party, that won seats in the legislature (Appendix A) endorsed candidates from almost all
provinces (PNGEC, 2006, online; Post-Courier, 1 August 2002).
35
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allowed for frequent 'party-hopping' or 'yo-yo' politics for opportunistic purposes
(May, 2002, p 7i 7 . The constant shifting of parliamentary loyalties was strongly
associated with frequent motions of no-confidence. Since independence, every
government has been a coalition government, and until 2002 no government had
served its full term 38 due to a no-confidence motion against residing governments.

A problem associated with the frequent use of a no-confidence vote is that it
renders political life an ultimately hollow and unproductive exercise. On the one
hand, the frequent use of no-confidence motions resulted in long adjournments of
parliament; an effective way to avoid a no-confidence vote. On the other hand, it
has created an atmosphere in which Prime Ministers are predominantly
preoccupied with the arduous task of holding the coalition together and keeping
members on side. The 'wheeling and dealing' of coalition politics has taken its
toll on good governance. Successive governments have been unable to maintain
long-term national policies, which in tum have contributed to a decline in the
state's capacity to serve the interest of its citizens (May, 2003b, pp 156-157, 164).

Shortcomings in the political systein mirror the wider acknowledgement that PNG
exhibits many of the signs of a weak state (Filer, 1992; Standish, 1994; Dinnen,
2001; Reilly, 2002a; May, 2003a; Morris & Stewart, 2005). Since independence,
the state has lacked the capacity to deliver its policies and services to its citizens
and has failed to maintain popular acceptance. As a consequence, the state now
37

Sir Mekere Mora uta initiated the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and
Candidates (OLIPPAC). The purpose of the constitutional reform was "to develop and nurture a
political culture in which intrinsic values of constitutional democracy are re&pected and maintained
through strengthening political parties and stabilising the executive" (Baker, 2005, p 102). The
law, which came into effect in 2002, incorporated provisions prohibiting party-hopping.
38
The current Somar~ government will be the first to complete a full five-year term. See Appendix
C for coalition governments since 1972.
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lacks authority over society and maintains a low level of political legitimacy.
Dinnen (200 1, p ~ 78) argues that the limited institutional capacity and legitimacy
of the state are deeply implicated in the growth of election-related violence. In the
absence of strong parties that would have the capacity to mobilize followers into
conflict, it seems to be more appropriate to examine the relationship between
election-related violence and the weak capacity of PNG's state.

Robert Rotberg, a prominent political scientist, recently produced a book to
examine how and why states decay and what can be done to prevent them from
collapsing. Rotberg (2003) categorises strong, weak, failing and collapsed nationstates according to political, social and economic criteria. Rotberg (2003, pp 2-4)
argues that it is the ability to deliver political goods to citizens that distinguishes
strong states from weak states, and weak states from failed states. Political goods
are those intangible and hard to quantify claims that provide the basis of social
contract between people and the state. This social contract is at the core of statesociety interactions. According to Rotberg (2003, p 3), there is a hierarchy of
political goods. At the top of the hierarchy is the supply of human security,
followed by the opportunity to participate freely in the political process and the
availability of various social services.

The implications for the state's ability to deliver the above mentioned political
goods for stability is real. Rotberg (2003, p 4) argues that strong states, which
perform well across all categories, are "places of enviable peace and order". In
contrast, weak states that show a mixed profile in their ability to provide the
essential political goods usually harbour intergroup tensions. Failed states, in
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which political goods are nearly non-existent, are to a large extent riddled with
ongoing conflicts (Rotbergl 2003, pp 4-9). Although Rotberg acknowledges the
relationship between the ability to provide political goods and political stability,
he does not explain how the lack of the former contributes to conflict. By using
Rotberg's hierarchy of political goods as a model, the aim of this chapter is to
examine how the weakness of the 'bits of the state' (Filer, 1992, p 118), including
the security forces, the Electoral Commission and provincial governments,
i

contribute to election-related violence.

Rotberg argues that the most important component of political goods is human
security. According to political theory, the state is irreplaceable in guaranteeing
this security (Lambach, 2006, p 408). The most fundamental function of the state
is to provide a secure environment for its citizens. In order to provide human
security, a nation-state needs to protect its sovereignty from outside intervention,
ensure a secure domestic climate free from attacks on the state's social structure
and the national order, to prevent crime, and to allow for its citizens to settle their
disputes, whether it be with the state or with fellow citizens, without resorting to
armed violence or other forms of physical coercion (Rotberg, 2003, p 3).

Whilst external factors do not pose a potential threat to PNG's security 39 due to
the country's relatively benign security environment, conflicts within the country
have greatly compromised stability. Elections, especially in the Highlands, are

39

Although problems have arisen in the past in three main areas: the border with Indonesia, the
border with Solomon Islands and border violations by non-state actors (May, 2006a, p 155).
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one of many dimensions ofPNG's insecure domestic climate40 , which provide a
good illustration of the state's inability to ensure the security of its citizens. In all
five Highlands provinces, the 2002 elections were characterised by the complete
breakdown of law and order. Two factors in particular stand out, the state's failure
to prevent the frequent use of illicit firearms by candidates and their supporters
and tht;lack of effective security operations, which undermined the safety of
many highlanders.

The 2002 elections in the Highlands claimed a number of lives in all provinces. In
the Western Highlands, two men were killed in clashes between supporters, with
dozens reported seriously injured (Post-Courier, 19 June 2002, pp 1-2). Two men
were killed in the Eastern Highlands a few days after polling started (Post-

Courier, 24 June 2002, p 3). In Chimbu province a ten-year old girl was shot dead
in a fight between supporters of two candidates at one of the polling stations

(National, 25 June 2002, p 3). Another fight between supporters in Kundiawa
Gembogl (Chimbu) electorate claimed the life of three men (Post-Courier, 2 July
2002, p 3). Two men were reported kille~ in Enga on the 4th July (National, p 2).
Just a week later a number of death in Enga rose to nine as election violence
escalated between rival supporters (Independent, 11 July 2002, p 7). Four people
were shot and chopped up in broad daylight in the Southern Highlands (Post-

Courier, 11 July 2002, p 3). Just a few days after polling started, the Post-Courier
(2 July 2002, p 3) reported that the number of casualties in the Highlands had
reached 13, with many more injured in election-related violence. Overall, it is
estimated that approximately 100 people lost their lives in election-related warfare
40
Other factors, such as tribal fighting, raskolism, gender violence and white-collar crime, also
contribute to instability (Claxton, 2000, p 263; Dinnen & Thompson, 2004, p 2; May, 2006, p
'
158).
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in the Highlands (Standish, 2003, p 11), which is a clear indication of the absence
of human security.

As the examples show, most of the incidents involved firearms. The use of guns in
clan warfare\started in 1985 with shotguns in the Western Highlands (Ketan,
2004, p 181). The first firearm-related death in tribal fighting was reported in
1987 in the Southern Highlands. Following the 1992 elections, politicians began
to deliver high-powered, military-style rifles to their tribesmen (Alper, 2005, p 35;
Standish, 1994, pp 57, 65). According to Singirok, the strength of tribes today is
measured by the number of weapons they have (Post-Courier, 12 September
2002, p 11). By supplying guns during clan warfare, politicians fulfil their
obligations towards their wantoks, who, as ordinary citizens, cannot afford to pay
the high costs of weapons and ammunitions. At the same time, "guns buy votes"
(Strathern, 1993a, p 47). By supporting their kin group, politicians not only gain
status, but also solicit political support.

In the 2002 elections in the Highlands, members of the political elite were deeply
implicated in the supply of illicit guns. Sir Mekere Morauta said "it was an open
secret" that guns were freely smuggled by politicians (Post-Courier, 24 May
2002, p 2). He also admitted that members of his own People's Democratic Party
were involved in smuggling operations (Dinnen & Thompson, 2004, p 10).
Reports from the Highlands revealed that during the 2002 elections "leaders in
high places" purchased a lot of high-powered weapons and circulated them to
their supporters and tribesmen (Post-Courier, 18 July 2002, p 2). It was also
recognised that politicians themselves stockpiled a range of firearms including
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AK47s, M16, M202, SLR and .303s to "keep a look out on individuals and
supporters of other candidates" (Post-Courier, 14 June 2002, p 3).

The use of illegal firearms to threaten, intimidate and even kill people by
candidates and their supporting tribes and clans means that national security had
reached a critical point. The presence of illicit high-powered guns and the
persistence of tribal warfare, which greatly intensifies during elections, are
indicators of state weakness. As noted by Rotberg (2003, p 3), the prime task of
the state is to ensure a secure environment for its citizens to live. To do that, the
state must implement and enforce legislations that deter criminal behaviour.

In PNG, many serious criminal cases are being acquitted for lack of proper

prosecution and I or the assumed lack of evidence. Whilst PNG has legislation for
the control of firearms (the Firearms Act 1988), this legislation is hardly ever
enforced. The conviction rate for firearm offences and related crimes is too low,
and penalties are often too lenient. Additionally, crimes by leaders and electoral
candidates are often condoned by state authorities (PNG Guns Control
Committee, 2005, pp 4, 27; Singirok, 2005, p 9).

Unless the state takes appropriate measures to effectively penalise indictable
offences, there is a great danger that violence during elections will further
intensify. Given the high incentives for winning an election, especially in the
Highlands, and the low likelihood of prosecution for illegal behaviour, candidates
will continue to use a variety of means, often illegal, to win. Hence the
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transformation of big-men syndrome into warlord syndrome (PNG Guns Control
Committee, 2005, p 22).

Section 197 of the Constitution (PNG, 2006, online) states that "The primary
functions of the Police Force are, in accordance with the Constitutional Laws and
Acts of the Parliament- (a) to preserve peace and good order in the country; and
(b) to maintain and, as necessary, enforce the law in an impartial and objective
manner." Accordingly, to protect the voters and ensure they exercise their
constitutional rights free of any form of interference is the responsibility of the
Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC), the official name of the
national police. Despite intentions to deal "swiftly and assertively" with those
who resort to .unlawful and violent tactics during the elections (Post-Courier, 24
April2002, p 5), in many cases the police were unable to prevent widespread
intimidation, fraud and violence in the Highlands.

The Electoral Commission (PNGEC) (2003, p 79) reported that police security at
polling booths was insufficient,

occasion~lly

non-existent. Standish (2003, p 143)

argues that ideally there should have been at least six police at each polling place
in the Highlands 41 . The fact that many polling booths were operating without
police presence meant that in many instances both voters and polling officials
were left at the mercy of candidates and their supporters, many of whom
controlled and took the law into their hands.

41

Some senior officers believed that squads of 20 well-armed men would have been needed to
provide adequate security (AusAID, 2003b, p 18).
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Despite rapid population growth, the police force, which currently has
approximately 5,000 sworn officers, has not grown significantly over the last 30
years (Dinnen, McLeod & Peake, 2006, p 89). At the 2000 Census, PNG had a
population of 5.2 million people (May, 2006a, p 152r This means that the ratio of
police to population was 1:1040, which fell far below of the UN recommendation,
which is 1:450 (Human Rights Watch, 2007, online). Although there are no
official figures of the number of policemen posted to the Highlands, given the
Highlands population, which according to the 2002 Census was nearly 2 million
(Post-Courier, 2 August 2002, p 11), it is apparent that police were overextended
by the need to secure many polling places at the same time. In fact, electionrelated deaths, violence and tension prompted the Police Commissioner, Joseph
Kupo, to call for assistance from the Defence Force (PNGDF) to boost police
manpower (Independent, 11 July 2002, p 6).

Major shortages of funding also impeded election security operations. Initially,
the police budget was K25 million, which was then cut back to K19 million.
Eventually, however, the funds made available for the police were only KlO
million (AusAID, 2003b, p 16). Although the police had its own separate budget,
due to shortages, some K4 million originally allocated to the PNGEC was
transferred by the national government to fund the Defence Force role (PostCourier, 11 June 2002, p 1). There were also administrative shortcomings that
further worsened police operations. Chimbu police, for example, withdrew
security at the counting centre in protest over non-payment of polling allowances
(Post-Courier, 18 July 2002, p 4). Similarly, the Western Highlands plunged into
chaos when frustrated policeman forced all counting in the province to a
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standstill, as they did not receive their allowances (Post-Courier, 12 July 2002, p
1).

Whilst shortage of officials, funding and administrative problems contributed to a
large extent as to why the police were unable to effectively perform their official
duties during the elections, some elements of the security forces voluntarily chose
not to be effective and not to protect the voters and the electoral process. Because
of their partisanship and undisciplined behaviour during the 1997 elections,
soldiers were confined to barracks during the 2002 elections {May, 2003b, p 160).
Despite this, 12 serving soldiers and a number of dishonourably discharged
soldiers, without permission from their commander, were seen assisting election
candidates in the Highlands (Post-Courier, 4 July 2002, p 1). In WHP there were
allegations that factions of the police force were allied either with Paias Wingti or
with his direct rival Fr Robert Lak42 (Standish, 2003, p 138). There were also
accusations in the media of the police taking political sides in SHP and Enga

(Post-Courier, 4 July 2002, p 3). Thus the presence of security forces, including
both the police and the PNGDF, has been. a controversial issue.

The next political good on Rotberg's hierarchy is the opportunity for citizens to
freely, openly and fully participate in the political process of the state (Rotberg,
2003, p.3). This political good provides the basis of the legitimacy of the state
(Patrick, 2006, p 29). To enable all eligible citizens the opportunity to play an
active part in politics the state must meet two important conditions, an electoral
roll of high integrity and an environment in which voters can cast their votes
42

Fr Rober Lak was the Provincial Member and Governor, who had defeated Wingti in 1997. Lak
lost to Wingti during the 2002 elections (Standish, 2003, p 138; PNGEC, 2006, online).
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without a sense of fear of intimidation (Commonwealth, 2002, p 11; 0' Grady et
al, 2007, online). The fact that during the 2002 elections in PNG neither of these
conditions was met illustrates the weak capacities of the state.

Despite section 50 of the Constitution, which regulates that "every citizen who is
of full capacity and has reached voting age ... has the right and shall be given the
opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs and to vote for elective
public office at genuine, periodic, free elections" (PNG, 2006, online), many
citizens of PNG were deprived of their basic human rights. Significant electoral
maladministration and considerable security problems contributed to a large
extent to the state's failure to satisfactorily conduct the 2002 national elections
and also added significantly to tensions and the potential for conflict.

One major underlying problem was the difficulty of providing an accurate voter
registration. In April 2002, the absence of an updated preliminary electoral roll for
public examination prompted Prime Minister Sir Mekere Morauta to seek an
interim court injunction to stop the issuing of writs (Post-Courier, 4 April 2002, p
1). The National Court, however, ruled that Sir Mekere's application was
inconclusive and flawed with abnormalities and irregularities, therefore the notice
of motion was incompetent. Justice Mark Sevua argued "The State cannot
complain about the state of the Common Roll when, on the evidence of the Chief
Electoral Commissioner, it (State) failed to allocate sufficient funding to update
the Common Roll"(Post-Courier, 8 April 2002, p 1).
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In fact, the major factor that impeded the Electoral Commission (PNGEC) to
produce an updated roll was the state's failure to disburse the necessary funds in
time. It was not until January 2002 that the PNGEC obtained the funds from the
state (Standish, 2003, p 135), consequently the exercise of correcting the largely
inaccurate 1997 roll started late43 and could not be completed in a timely manner.
When voting began in June 2002 it became apparent that the update of the roll, or
the lack thereof, caused considerable problems nationwide with many names of
voters either in the wrong electorates and wards or left out (Post-Courier, 5 June
2002, p 1)
to vote

45

44

.

From 1992, peoples' names have to be on the roll in order for them

• The

Electoral Commission failed to process over a million claims for

enrolment before the rolls were printed (Standish, 2003, p 135), which possibly
meant that over a million people were prevented to cast their votes.

The failure to record many new names on the rolls is in sharp contrast with the
Highlands experience. In the Highlands, in all five provinces, the electoral roll
contained an enormously inflated number of electors (Standish, 2003, p 135). As a
result, all provinces have recorded a vote .more than 150% of the indicative census
figure for eligible electors. In the case of Chimbu province, for example, the vote
figure was as high as 285% 46 . Additionally, the number of votes cast in the
Highlands provinces increased an average of 75.73% from the 1997 election47 ,

43

Following the 1997 national elections, the Parliament passed a motion for the PNGEC to use the
1997 National Election Common Roll for the 2002 elections (Post-Courier, 28 March 2002, p 22).
44
Mostly in Port Moresby, Bougainville, Lae and in some urban areas (Post-Courier, 2 August
2002, p 11).
.
45
In 1992, an amendment to the Organic Law on National Elections abolished 'Section 141'
voting. Before 1991, people, whose names did not appear on the roll, were allowed to vote if they
£rovided legal age and residential requirements (Dinnen, 2001, p 152).
6
See Appef1dix D for the analysis of the 2002 Census and Common Roll by province.
47
See Appendix E for the comparison of 1997 and 2002 vote in four Highlands provinces.
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despite an average population growth rate of around 2.5% (May, 2006a, p 152) 48 .
This alarming increase demonstrates the escalation of electoral fraud in the form
of multiple voting that was occurring in the Highlands.

In addition to the delay in funding to update the roll, funding for running the
election was also reportedly provided late (AusAID, 2003b, p 23). Election
managers expressed their concerns about the lack of financial capacity to transport
ballot boxes to the districts (Post-Courier, 14 June 2002, p 1). As a consequence,
in many Highlands' electorates polling started late. Polling in both Enga and SHP,
for example, was scheduled for the 251h of June (National, 4 June 2002, p 8).
While polling in Enga did not start until the 28th of June (National, 28 June 2002,
p 3), in SHP, it was delayed until the 05 1h of July (Post-Courier, 5 July 2002, p 2).
These changes in polling schedules resulted in the disenfranchisement of some
electors as the PNGEC failed to provide adequate information about the new
polling arrangements, consequently many people were absent at the time of actual
polling (PNGEC, 2003, p 72).

"

Another factor that prevented many people to express their political will was the
inadequate security of ballot boxes. Sometimes whole clans missed out on voting
either because they never received ballot boxes as they had frequently been
hijacked or because the ballot boxes containing their marked ballot papers were
destroyed (Gibbs, 2004, pp 9-11). Several newspaper reports indicated that the
police often watched helplessly and could do little about saving the ballot boxes.

48

It is more likely that the population growth rate for the Highlands is higher than the national
average given that Southern Highlands and Eastern Highlands provinces were reported to have a
population growth rat~ of 3.6%. Also, Western Highlands' population grew by 2.7% between 1990
and 2000 (National, 3 May, 2002, p 3).
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Supporters of a candidate in Mount Hagen, for example, held up polling officials
and policemen with firearms and walked off with numerous ballot boxes (PostCourier, 19 June 2002, p 2). Similarly, in SHP, supporters overpowered the police

and removed all ballot boxes containing 30,000 marked ballot papers (PostCourier, 11 July 2002, p 3). In Enga province, 30 men armed with M-16s and

Kalashnikovs raided the police station and dynamited one-third of the completed
ballots. This time the police run away (Post-Courier, 12 July 2002, p 1; 'Pigs and
Politics', 2002).

The fact that many people were unable to cast their votes either because their
names were omitted or left off the roll or due to delays in polling contributed to
considerable frustration and anger from parts of many electorates. Similarly, the
hijacking and destruction of ballot boxes, which robbed many electors of their
constitutional and universal rights, again resulted in anger. As one of the villagers,
interviewed after the Enga incident, said "Everyone's not really happy, they're
very, very angry now for this incident" ('Pigs and Politics', 2002). It can be
argued that the state's failure to provide t~e opportunity for its citizens to
participate in the political process raised the level of tension. It can also be
assumed that the inflation of the roll in the Highlands contributed to violence.
Inflating the roll is intentional; it is organised by candidates to increase their share
of the vote (AusAID, 2003b, p 12; Standish, 2007, p 144). While 'rigging' the
system facilitated multiple voting, in the absence of adequate security, it may also
. have provided the incentive to harass, intimidate and threaten voters to secure
their votes and coerce polling officials to sign and to allow the mass-marking of
all available ballot papers.
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The last key political good on Rotberg's hierarchy relates to service delivery. The
state is expected to supply essential goods and services to its citizenry. These
include healthcare, education, physical and communicational infrastructure, and a
beneficial fiscal environment in which citizens can pursue their economic interests
(Rotberg, 2003, pp 3-4). Although section 2 (3) of the five 'National Goals and
Directive Principles' included in the introduction to the Constitution (May, 2004,
p 309) defines that "every effort to be made to achieve an equitable distribution of
incomes and other benefits of development among individuals and throughout the
various parts of the country" (PNG, 2006, online), many Papua New Guineans,
especially those living in rural areas, are left without essential social services.

The breakdown of basic service delivery in rural areas has been widely
acknowledged (National Economic and Fiscal Commission, 2003; Gibson &
Rozelle, 2003; Monis & Stewart, 2005; Manning, 2005). The Highlands is one of
the poorest regions in the country49 with very poor infrastructure and poor access
to health and educational services (Gibson & Rozelle, 2003, pp 165-167; World
Bank, 2004, pp 14-17). In 2002, for example, Mendi High School (SHP) was
closed because operational funds for the Provincial Education Office had not been
received. Roads were in a tenible state of disrepair (Post-Courier, 10 May 2002, p
11). In the WHP, a measles outbreak claimed 51 children's lives because the
Mount Hagen General Hospital lacked the necessary drug supplies, including
antibiotics and intravenous fluids (Post-Courier, 1 May 2002, p 19). Similarly, the
Kundiawa General Hospital (Chimbu) was in a critical state, as desperately
needed drug supplies did not reach the hospital (Post-Courier, 1 May 2002, p 6).
49

The two most poverty-stricken regions in PNG are the Highlands and the Momase/North Coast
region (Gibson and Rozelle, 2003, p 166).
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Under the Organic Law, national functions such as defence and economic
management are the respon_sibility of the National Government, while key areas of
service delivery are the responsibility of provincial governments (Morris &
Stewart, 2005, online). Provincial governments have been ineffective since the
1980s50 . However, since the 1995 reform, which replaced the previous Organic
Law on Provincial Government with the Organic Law on Provincial and LocalLevel Governments (OLPLLG) (May, 2002, p 7), their capacities have
deteriorated drastically (Standish, 2007, p 204). The ineffectiveness of provincial
governments largely results from ill-organised and dysfunctional funding
arrangements. The lack of transparency and accountability with regards to the
allocation of funds has provided for entrenched corruption, which ultimately
contributed to the further deterioration of service delivery and become debilitating
to good governance.

The nominal primary purpose of the OLPLLG was to further decentralise power
to local level governments by abolishing elected provincial assemblies. In effect,
the reform re-centralised power by giving more influence to national Members of
Parliament (MP), especially the Provincial Governors, over the allocation of
district operation funds for government services, as well as the Electoral
Development Funds (known as 'slush funds') for discretionary allocation.
Additionally, MPs also· have strong influence over staffing matters such as the
appointment of senior officials (Standish, 2006, p 204).

50

Until the 1995 reform some 14 provincial governments had been suspended mostly for financial
mismanagement, but also for maladministration, nepotism and favouritism (Regan, 1997, pp 4951).
'
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Between 1984 and 1999 MPs' discretionary funds grew from KlO,OOO to Kl.5
million per annum. At the s_ame time, basic operating funds provided by the
national government for provinces have considerably declined (Standish, 2006, pp
204-205). Although provinces are lacking the means to deliver basic services,
only a few MPs transfer their discretionary funds and other district support grants
to local-level and provincial governments 51 . Due to the fact that discretionary
funds are largely unaccountable, and their use is not transparent (Standish, 2006, p
205), MPs are more likely to spend their K1.5 million on rewarding themselves
and their supporters rather than on much needed economic development projects
in their electorates. Sir Peter Barter, Inter-Government Relation Manager, accused
the administration of the Southern Highlands Province of being a kleptocracy rule by thieves for thieves. He argued that governors, acting governors and
administrators (often appointed by politicians) used public money that should
have gone into better roads, health centres and schools (Post-Courier, 21 October
2002, p 1).

Dinnen (2001, p 179) argues that the diminishing capacity of government services
is directly linked to political patronage. The public knows about the discretionary
funds and they have high expectations from their MPs. National parliamentarians
readily redirect state resources to members of their 'constituency' in an effort to
sustain their career. They use these funds to buy votes, to sponsor pork-barrel
projects and to nurture other tit-for-tat relationships as a means to strengthen their
local power base and enhance their chances for re-election (Dinnen, 2001, p 173;
Okole, 2003, p 58). These distributive activities, which only benefit a small
51

There are a few exceptions, such as East New Britain and North Solomons, where MPs do
transfer their funds to' the districts (Standish, 2007, p 149; Okole, 2003, p 54).
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minority, mean that for many highlanders the word development remains
unknown as politicians hav.e greatly undermined the capacity of provincial
governments by reducing the funds available for services.

Standish (2006, p 204) argues that the weaker the provincial governments
become, the more central the role of the MPs becomes, and the more intense and
ultimately destructive the political competition for their position. These funds
provide a real incentive for gaining political office, inspiring more and more
candidates to stand. During the 2002 elections, more than 1000 candidates
contested the 39 Highlands seats (Post-Courier, 16 April 2002, p 2). This intense
political competition has further been facilitated by the first-past-the-post (FPTP)
electoral system52 , which provided an opportunity for candidates to gain elections
with a relatively small proportion of the overall vote53 • The low thresholds
required for victory have to a large extent encouraged electoral violence (Reilly,
2002c, p 250; Okole, 2002, p 37). In their pursuit of maximising votes, rival
candidates readily resort to all sorts of illegal activities. Additionally, it can also
be argued that the "growing primacy of p~litics" as a means of economic
development (Dinnen, 2001, p 170) has also increased inter-tribal tensions and
violence as those who are left out feel neglected and frustrated.

By using Rotberg' hierarchy of political goods, human security, the opportunity to
vote and service delivery, this chapter has attempted to answer how the weak
52

In the 1964, 1968 and 1972 elections for the House of Assembly PNG used the optional
preferential voting (OPV) system. FPTP, which was introduced into the constitution in 1975, was
last used during the 2002 elections. Future elections, including the coming-up 2007 elections, will
be conducted under the limited preferential voting (LPV) system (Reilly, 2002c, pp 239-252).
53
In 2002, there was only one candidate who acquired more than a 50 per cent majority vote. In
general, successful candidates won with a median of 16 per cent. However, some :MPs won with
only 7 per cent of the votes from their constituency (Okole, 2002, p 37; Baker, 2005, p 100).
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capacity of the PNG state provided for the continuing environment of electionrelated violence in the Hig4lands region. The 2002 Highlands election is a
testimony that the state lacks the ability to deliver all three political goods defined
by Rotberg to its citizens, subsequently undermining the social contract between
the people and the state. Unless appropriate measures are taken to strengthen the
political institutions, elections will be marred by violence further eroding the
legitimacy of the PNG state.
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Conclusion

The aim of this thesis has been to examine how aspects of ethnic conflict theory
and weak state theory are ~seful in explaining election-related violence in Papua
New Guinea. The significance of this aim is to highlight that a comprehensive
explanation of election-related violence necessitates an integrated multidisciplinary and multi-theoretical perspective. Election-related fighting is one
dimension of internal conflict, which since the end of the Cold War has become a
destabilising feature affecting many developing nations. Although attempts have
been made to define what constitutes election-related violence, theoretical
explanations of the phenomenon seem to be missing in the social sciences.

Fighting that flares up around election times is a significant public order problem
that requires attention and subsequently appropriate actions, especially in the light
of the preoccupation of the Western world to assist developing nations to establish
and consolidate well-functioning democratic states in an effort to create and
maintain regional stability. Election-related violence has two serious implications
forth~

health and viability of democracy. 'Firstly, it has a strong potential to erode

the legitimacy of the state as it suggests that those in power, or at least some of
them, are elected by the use of force rather than by the collective will of a
constituency. Secondly, election-related violence, as a form of internal conflict,
can pose a threat to the stability of already fragile nation-states by further
destabilising internal security, which is an essential requirement for democracy.

Election-related violence has not emerged in a vacuum. It is primarily the product
of the constellation of historical, cultural, sociological and political factors. Thus,
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it follows that election-related violence is a complex phenomenon that cannot be
adequately analysed by a sipgle disciplinary or theoretical perspective. It requires
a multi-theoretical and multi-disciplinary approach, which needs to be tailored to
a specific country in question.

The analytical focus of this thesis has centred on one specific country of the South
Pacific, Papua New Guinea. The country, which is situated at Australia's
doorstep, is among many developing nations experiencing political instability.
This political instability partly results from ongoing fighting, which has
intensified during election times. Election-related violence is especially disturbing
in one particular region of PNG, the Highlands. Tribal fighting in the PNG
Highlands is deeply rooted in historical and cultural practices. It was exactly these
traditional customs, which have interacted with the process of democratisation to
produce election-related violence.

In an attempt to conceptualise election-related violence from a multi-theoretical
perspective, this thesis applied ethnic conflict theory and weak state theory to the
2002 elections in the Highlands region in order to analyse those sociological and
political factors that exacerbate conflict. Owing to the unique social structure and
traditional practices, ethnic conflict theory has been limited to the examination of
primordialism and modernisation. The analytical focus of this thesis has been built
on the meta-theories of Clifford Geertz, Robert H. Bates, Donald L. Horowitz and
Robert I. Rotberg. While none aims to specifically address election-related
violence, each of the meta-theories purports to explain different dimensions of
inter-group conflict. Consequently, the arguments presented by these prominent
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social scientists have considerable merit in terms of explaining election-related
violence. But, at the same t~me, the analysis of the 2002 Highlands election also
reveals some shortcomings of their explanatory power. An assessment of the
usefulness of ethnic conflict theory and weak state theory is summarised next.

The primordial approach proposed by Clifford Geertz has been a useful analytical
tool in highlighting the importance and endurance of kinship affiliations in postcolonial Highlands' societies. It has aiso been helpful to identify the psychological
sources of conflict, which are motivated by the desire to achieve relative group
worth. This is particularly relevant to PNG, especially in the Highlands, where
collective identity and the prestigious status of groups have a primacy for many
people. In the electoral context, group solidarity is manifested through block
voting practices and the defence of a candidate's base vote area. These corporate
activities serve to enhance the chance of a clan member to win elections. Groups
enter into competition because having one's member elected in parliament gives a
superior status to the group compared to other groups.

However, the primordial approach has a number of shortcomings, consequently it
lacks the capacity to adequately explain election-related violence. The emphasis
given to primordial attachments implies in-group cooperation versus inter-group
hostility. Yet, the analysis of the 2002 Highlands election revealed that group
unity has been breaking down as fighting occurs not only between groups, but
also within the group. Also, while primordialism captures the strength and nonrational character of social ties, it pays no attention to the material expectations of
groups and to the role of elites in the mobilization and manipulation of collective
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identity, which play an equally important role in election-related violence. These
deficiencies have been addressed by modernisation theorists, hence the
importance of incorporating their argument into the analysis.

In contrast to the primordial approach, modernisation theories seek to explain

conflict according to a rational choice analysis. Modernisation theories have
proven to be constructive in understanding election-related violence in material
terms. It can be argued that Robert Bates's theory of political competition over the
benefits generated by modernity is highly relevant in the Highlands. In accordance
with Bates's argument, it is the aspiration of candidates either to retain or obtain
power coupled with the aspiration of groups to gain access to various government
funds, which results in conflict. In the competition for power, Highlands
politicians use patronage politics played out with state resources as an instrument
to mobilise support and gain re-election. The unequal distribution of goods and
services is a source of anger and frustration, which inevitably leads to the
fractionalisation between groups within the same electorate.

Although Horowitz criticised modernisation theories for paying undue attention to
elite ambitions, it can be argued that Bates's theory pays insufficient attention to
the elite because it lacks the capacity to explain why, in the competition for
power, elites even resort to violence against members of their own groups. In the
Highlands, vote-buying practices are frequently employed by those with political
aspirations. The large amount of money being invested in elections can trigger
retaliation as well as the intimidation of voters. Similarly to primordialism,
modernisation theory also falls short in explaining election-related violence.
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Despite their limitations, the two aspects of ethnic conflict theory provide
valuable insights into conflict motives. However, the apparent lack of consensus
between the two approaches weakens their explanatory power. Whilst Bates
contributed paramount importance to the material interpretation of conflict over
Geertz's primordial approach, Horowitz favoured the realm of collective feeling
over the realm of material interest. It is important to note that both principles are
equally at work and they complement one another. The analysis of the 2002
Highlands elections has revealed that election-related violence results not only
from the desire to elevate the status of the group, but also from the rational pursuit
of benefits. Therefore, a conclusion can be reached that each of the theories is
insufficient in isolation. It is the combination of the two perspectives that provides
a more inclusive rationalization of sociological aspects of election-related
violence.

The analysis of the 2002 Highlands elections highlights the role played· by
institutional constraints in election-related violence. This follows that besides
sociological factors, political aspects also .need to be considered when discussing
c

conflict. By incorporating ethnic party politics into his paradigm, it was Donald
Horowitz, who came closest to assessing the role of the state in conflictual group
relationships. In the case of PNG, where the party system is inherently weak and
parties do not form around ethnic groups, Horowitz's argument does have
shortcomings. For instance, PNG's party system points to the broader problem of
weak state capacities, which is a significant reason behind election-related
violence.
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Robert Rotberg's three criteria for the effective functioning of nation-states,
human security, the opportunity for political participation and social services, has
been a valuable tool with which to examine how the weak capacities of the PNG
state contribute to election-related violence. Although the state lacks the capacity
to provide all three political goods, what has become apparent in the analysis is
that it is primarily the lack of the most important political good, human security,
which allows for increased violence. The high number of election-related
casualties in the Highlands in 2002 is a testimony that the PNG state is unable to
provide a secure environment for its citizens to live. Inadequate police presence
and ineffective judicial arrangements provide for the continuing environment of
conflict. These shortcomings of the state have been present since the early 1970s.
Just as they facilitated the resurgence of warfare at the end of the colonial era,
they now contribute to the intensification of election-related violence.

Whilst Rotberg emphasises the importance of political goods in the establishment
of the social contract, which is at the heart of state-society interactions, he appears
to underestimate the underlying cultural c.onstraints facing governments in weak
states. In PNG, the weak traditions of civil politics foster the endurance of
kinship affiliations. People maintain their loyalty to their kinship groupings,
because they find their emotional, physical and material security within their
primordial communities.

Primordialism, modernisation theory and weak state theory all make a
considerable contribution to the understanding of how various social and political
factors contribute to election-related violence. However, as meta-theories each is

69

limited to explaining the specific dimension of election-related violence in PNG.
Their differing

assumption~

give them partial explanatory power. Aspects of

violence cannot be examined in isolation. A comprehensive explanation of
election-related violence demands a synthesis that brings together the historical,
cultural, sociological and political factors. Given that each country has a different
history and unique cultural practices, an assessment of election-related violence
can only be fully effective if it is case specific. Elections are at the heart of any
democracy. The analysis of the debacle of the 2002 elections in the Highlands
stresses a need for electoral conflict prevention policies if democracy is to be
strengthened in PNG. These policies can only be responsive if they tackle the
problem through an overarching approach, which is yet to be developed.

70

References

Alper, P. (2005). Gun-running in Papua New Guinea: from arrows to assault
weapons in the Southern Highlands. Geneva: Graduate Institute of
International Studies. Retrieved from
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/spe_reports_pdf/20
05-sr5-papuanewguinea. pdf, 12/10/2006
AusAID. (2000). Australia and Papua New Guinea: Development Cooperation
program 2000-2003. Canberra: The Commonwealth of Australia.
AusAID. (2003a). The contribution of Australian aid to Papua New Guinea's
development 1975-2000. Canberra: The Commonwealth of Australia.
AusAID. (2003b). Review of Australia's electoral assistance program to PNG.
Unpublished report, Canberra: The Commonwealth of Australia.
AusAID. (2006). Australian aid: Promoting growth and stability. Canberra: The
Commonwealth of Australia.
Baker, L. (2005). Political integrity laws in Papua New Guinea and the search for
stability. In Pacific Economic Bulletin, 20(1), 98-117.
Bates, R. H. (1983). Modernisation, ethnic competition, and the rationality of
politics in contemporary Africa. In D. Rothchild and V. A. Olorunsola
(Eds.), State versus ethnic claims: African policy dilemmas (pp. 152-166).
Boulder: Westview Press.
Chahal, P. and Daloz, J.P. (2006). Culture troubles: Politics and the
interpretation of meaning. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Chand, S. (2003). PNG economic survey: some weak signs of recovery. Canberra:
the Australian National University. Retrieved October 11, 2006, from
· http:/I eprints. anu.edu. au/archive/000023 50/011chand2003. pdf
Chandler, D. (2006). Empire in denial. London: Pluto Press.
Claxton, K. (2000). 'Violence, internal security and security-stakeholders in
Papua New Guinea'. InS. Dinnen and A. Ley (Eds.), Reflections on
Violence in Melanesia (pp. 263-271). Canberra: Asia Pacific Press.
Commonwealth Expert Group. (2002). Report of the Commonwealth Expert
Group on Papua New Guinea's electoral arrangements. Retrieved
November 25, 2002, from
http://www.thecommmonwealth.org/docs/elections/PNG/PNGelectoralrpt.
doc
Conteh-Morgan, E. (2004). Collective political violence: An introduction to the
theories and cases ofviolent conflict. New York: Routledge.

71

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2007). Papua New Guinea Country
Brief- November 2006. Retrieved April 18, 2007, from
http://www. dfat. gov. au/ geo/png/png_brief.html
Dika, E. (2003). The 2002 national election in Chimbu province. In Catalysts:
Social Pastoral Journal for Melanesia, 33(1), 41-47.
Dinnen, S. (1996). Violence, security and the 1992 elections. In Y. Saffu
(Ed.), The 1992 PNG elections: change and continuity in electoral politics
(pp. 77-104). Political and Social Change Monograph 23. Canberra:
Australian National University.
Dinnen, S. (2001). Law and order in a weak state: Crime and politics in Papua
New Guinea. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Dinnen, S. and Thompson, E. (2004). Gender and small arms violence in Papua
New Guinea. Canberra: Australian National University, State Society and
Governance in Melanesia Project Discussion Paper 2004/8: 1-16.
Dinnen, S., McLeod, A. and Peake; G. (2006). Police-building in weak states:
Australian approaches in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands. In
Civil Wars, 8(2), 87-108.
Dorney,' S. (1990). Papua New Guinea: People politics and history since 1975.
Milsons Point: Random House Australia.
Dorney, S. (2002). 'If you don't give them money they won't vote for you': The
election campaign in Lagaip-Porgera. In R.J. May and R. Anere (Eds.),
Maintaining democracy: the 1997 elections in Papua New Guinea (pp.
113-121). Canberra: Australian National University.
Eriksen, T. H. (2001). Small places, large issues: An introduction to social and
cultural anthropology. London: Pluto Press.
Feil, D. K. (1987). The evolution of Highland Papua New Guinea societies.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Filer, C. (1992). The escalation of disintegration and the reinvention of authority.
In M. Spriggs and D. Dennon (Eds.), The Bougainville crisis: 1991
Update (pp. 112-140).Political and Social Change Monograph, 16.
Canberra: Australian National University.
Fisher, J. (2002). Electoral conflict and violence. A strategy for study and
prevention. Retrieved April 21, 2007, from
http://unpan1. un. org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNP ANO 1
9255.pdf
'Foreign Correspondent' [Television broadcast]. (2002, August 21). Australia:
ABC.

72

Freeman, M. (1998). Theories of ethnicity, tribalism and nationalism. InK.
Christie (Ed.), Ethnic conflict, tribal politics. A global perspective (pp. 1533). Richmond: Curzon Press.
Fukuyama, F. (2004). State building: Governance and world order in the twentyfirst century. London: Profile Books Ltd.
Fund for Peace (2007). Papua New Guinea. Retrieved April19, 2007, from
http://www.fundforpeace.org/publications/profiles/cp_papua_new_guinea.
pdf
Geertz, C. (1963). The integrative revolution. Primordial sentiments and civil
politics in the new states. In C. Geertz (Ed.), Old Societies and New States.
The questfor modernity in Asia and Africa (pp. 105-157). London: The
Free Press of Glencoe.
Gelu, A. (2000). The emergence of a non-liberal democratic political culture in
Papua New Guinea. In M.A. Rynkiewich & R. Seib
(Eds.), Point No 24, Politics in Papua New Guinea: Continuities, changes
and challenges, 87-117.
Gelu, A. (2003). Political decay in Papua New Guinea: the conduct of the 2002
National election. In Catalyst: Social Pastoral Journal for Melanesia,
33(1), 4-27.
Gibbs, P. (2004). Democracy and Enga political culture. Canbena: Australian
National University, State Society and Governance in Melanesia Project
Discussion Paper 2004/1: 1-14.
Gibson, J. and Rozelle, S. (2003). 'Poverty and Access to Roads in Papua New
Guinea' in Economic Development and Cultural Change, 52(1), 159-186.
Gordon, R. J. and Meggitt, M. J. (1985). Law and order in the New Guinea
Highlands. Encounters with Enga.' Hanover: University Press of New
England.
Gupta, N. S. (1978). Issues in political development and economic and social
change. New Delhi: Light and Life Publishers.
Haley, N. (2004). Afailed election: the case of the Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open
electorate. Canbena: Australian National University, State Society and
Governance in Melanesia Project Discussion Paper 2004/1: 16-26.
Handelman, H. (2003). The challenge of third world development. New Jersey:
Pearson Education.
Horowitz, D. L. (2000). Ethnic groups in conflict (2nd ed.). Berkeley: University
of California Press.

73

Human Rights Watch. Papua New Guinea: "Making their own rules": Vl
Failure of police response. Retrieved April 19, 2007, from
http://www .hrw .org/reports/2005/png0905/htm
Human Security Report (2005). Retrieved April17, 2007, from
http://www.humansecurityreport.info/HSR2005_PDF/Part1.pdf
Huntington, S. P. (1991). The third wave: Democratisation in the late twentieth
century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Independent state of Papua New Guinea. Constitution of the independent state of
Papua New Guinea. Retrieved December 22, 2006, from
http://www. paclii. org/pg/legis/consol_act/cotisopng534/
Ketan, J. (1996). Electoral politics in Mount Hagen: the Dei Open Election. In Y.
Saffu (Ed.), The 1992 PNG elections: change and continuity in electoral
Politics (pp. 240-265). Political and Social Change Monograph 23.
Canberra: Australian National University.
Ketan, J. (2000). Leadership and political culture. In M.A. Rynkiewich & R. Seib
(Eds.), Point No 24, Politics in Papua New Guinea: Continuities, changes
and challenges, 44-85.
Ketan, J. (2004). The name must not go down. Political competition and statesociety relations in Mount Hagen, Papua New Guinea. Fiji: University of
the South Pacific.
Knauft, B. M. (1990). Melanesian warfare: A theoretical history. In Oceania, 60,
250-311.
Krasner, S.D. and Pascual, C. (2005). 'Addressing State Failure' in Foreign
Affairs, 84(4), 153-163.
Lakane, J. & Gibbs, P. (2003). Haves and have-nots: the.2002 elections in the
· Enga province of PNG. In Catalyst: Social Pastoral Journal for
Melanesia, 33(2), 96-113.
Lambach, D. (2006). 'Security, Development and the Australian Security
Discourse about Failed States' in Australian Journal of Political Science,
41(3), 407-418.
Manning, M. (2005). Papua New Guinea thirty years on. In Pacific Economic
Bulletin, 20(1), 145-158.

May, R.J. (2002). Election 1997: an overview. In R.J. May and R. Anere (Eds.)
Maintaining democracy: the 1997 elections in Papua New Guinea (pp. 115). Canberra: Australian National University.

74

May, R. J. (2003a). Disorderly democracy: political turbulence and institutional
reform in Papua New Guinea. Canberra: Australian National University,
State Society and G_overnance in Melanesia Project Discussion Paper
2003/3: 1-10.
May, R. J. (2003b). Turbulence and reform in Papua New Guinea. In Journal of
Democracy, 14(1), 154-164.
May, R.J. (2004). State and Society in Papua New Guinea; The First Twenty-Five
Years. Canberra: ANU E Press.
May, R.J. (2006a). 'Papua New Guinea: Disorderly Democracy or Dysfunctional
State?'. In D. Rumley, V. L. Forbes, & C. Griffin, C. (Eds.), Australia's
arc of instability: The political and cultural dynamics of regional Security
(pp. 151-170). Dordrecht: Springer.
May, R. J. (2006b). The 'clan vote' in Papua New Guinea open electorates. In The
Journal of Pacific Studies, 29(1), 108-130.
McLeod, A. (2002). Contesting violence: State and Simbu approaches to law and
order in contemporary Papua New Guinea. Unpublished doctoral
dissertation, University of Queensland, Queensland.
Meggitt, M. (1977). Blood is their argument: Warfare among the Mae Enga
tribesmen of the New Guinea Highlands. Palo Alto: Mayfield Publishing
Company.
Melson, R. and Wolpe, H. (1971). Modernisation and the politics of
communalism: a theoretical perspective. In R. Melson & H. Wolpe (Eds.)
Nigeria: modernisation and the politics of communalism (pp. 1-42).
Michigan: Michigan State University Press.
Morgan, M. (2005). Cultures of dominance: Institutional and cultural influences
. on parliamentary politics in Melanesia. Canberra: Australian National
University, State Society and Governance in Melanesia Project Discussion
Paper 2005/2: 1-13.
Morris, A. and Stewart, R. (2005). Analytical Report for the White Paper on
Australia's Aid Program- Papua New Guinea. Retrieved Apri112, 2007,
from
http://www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pubout.cfm?ID=7331_1483_8849_
9322_6182
National Economic and Fiscal Commission (2003). Review of intergovernmental
financing arrangements: Interim report and proposals for a new
framework. Retrieved May 5, 2007, from
http://www.nefc.gov.pg/NEFC%20Interim%20Report%20FINAL%20Ma
y%202003.pdf

75

Nonggorr, J. (2006). Electoral reforms- improving election administration and
management. Canberra: Australian National University, State Society and
Governance in Melanesia Project Discussion Paper 2006/3: 6-15.
O'Grady, P., Lopez-Pintor, R. & Stevens, M. The work of Domestic Election
Observer Groups. Retrieved April17, 2007, from http://www.needsnetwork.org/pdfs/Promoting-and-Defend. pdf
Okole, H. T. (2002). Institutional decay in a Melanesian parliamentary
democracy: Papua New Guinea. In Development Bulletin, 60, 37-40.
Okole, H. T. (2003). Enhancing nation building through the provincial
government system in Papua New Guinea: Overtures toward federalism.
In D. Kavanamur, C. Yala & Q. Clements (Eds.), Building a nation in
Papua New Guinea: Views of the post-independence generation (pp. 5167). Canberra: Australian National University.
Paney Report (1973). Report of the Committee investigating tribal fighting in the
Highlands. Port Moresby: Territory of Papua New Guinea, Government
Printer.
Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission. National Election 2002.
Retrieved October 6, 2006, from
http://www. pngec. gov. pg/resultsNat2002/
Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission (2003). Evaluation Report on the 2002
Election. Unpublished report, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea.
Papua New Guinea Guns Control Committee. (2005). National gun control
strategy. Policy submission (No /2005) for members of the National
Executive Council. (Confidential). Goroka: PNG Guns Control Summit.
Patrick, S. (2006). 'Weak States and Glo~al Threats: Facts or Fiction?'. In The
. Washington Quarterly, 29(2), 27-53.
'Pigs and Politics' [Television Broadcast]. (2002, July 31). On Dateline.
Australia: SBS. Transcript available at
http: I/news. sbs. com. au/dateline/index. php ?page=archive&daysum=200207-31#
Powell, G. B. (1982). Contemporary democracies: participation, stability and
violence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rappaport, R. A (1984). Pigs for the ancestors: Ritual in the ecology of a New
Guinea people. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Regan, A J. (1997)~ The operation of the provincial government system. In R. J.
May & A J. Regan (Eds.), Political decentralisation in a new state: The
experience of provincial government in Papua New Guinea (pp. 21-55).
Bathurst: Crawford House Publishing.

76

Reilly, B. (1999). 'Party politics in Papua New Guinea: a deviant case?'. In
Pacific Affairs, 72('2), 225-246.
Reilly, B. (2000). 'Democracy, Ethnic Fragmentation, and Internal Conflict:
Confused Theories, Faulty Data, and the "Crucial Case" of Papua New
Guinea'. In International Security, 25(3), 162-186.
Reilly, B. (2002a). Political engineering and party politics in Papua New Guinea.
In Party politics, 8(6), 701-718.
Reilly, B. (2002b). Continuity and change in Papua New Guinea elections. In R.J.
May and R. Anere (Eds.), Maintaining democracy: the 1997 elections in
Papua New Guinea (pp. 17-37). Canberra: Australian National University.
Reilly, B. (2002c). Current developments in the Pacific. Back to the future? The
political consequences of electoral reform in Papua New Guinea. In The
Journal of Pacific History, 37(2), 239-253.
Riches, D. (1986). The anthropology of violence. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Rotberg, R.I. (2003). Failed states, Collapsed states, Weak states: Causes and
Indicators. In R. I. Rotberg (Ed.) State Failure and State Weakness in a
time of Terror (pp. 1-25). Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland (1951). Notes and
queries on anthropology (6 1h rev. ed.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Ltd.
Rumley, D. (2006). The emergence of Australia's arc of instability. In D. Rumley,
V. L. Forbes, & C. Griffin, C. (Eds.), Australia's arc of instability: The
political and cultural dynamics of regional Security (pp. 11-22).
Dordrecht: Springer.
Rumley, D., Forbes. L. and Griffin, C. (2006). Introduction: Australia and the arc
of instability. In D. Rumley, V. L. Forbes, & C. Griffin, C. (Eds.),
Australia's arc of instability: The political and cultural dynamics of
regional Security (pp. 1-9). Dordrecht: Springer.
Saffu, Y. (1996) Continuity and change in PNG electoral politics. In Y. Saffu
(Ed.) The 1992 PNG elections: change and continuity in electoral politics
(pp. 1-42). Political and Social Change Monograph 23. Canberra:
Australian National University.
Sahlins, M.D. (1963). 'Poor Man, Rich Man, Big-Man, Chief: Political Types in
Melanesia and Polynesia'. InT. G. Harding and B. J. Wallace (1970).
(Eds.), Cultures of the Pacific (pp. 203-215). New York: The Free Press.
Sillitoe, P. (1977). Land shortage and war in New Guinea. In Ethnology, 16, 71-

81..

77

Singirok, J. (2005). The use of illegal guns: Security implications for Papua New
Guinea. Canberra: Australian National University, State Society and
Governance in Melanesia Project Discussion Paper 2005/5: 1-11.
Standish, B. (1973). 'The Highlands: ol i no save harim mipela!'. In New
Guinea, 8(3), 4-30.
Standish, B. (1978). 'The big-man model' reconsidered: power and stratification
in Chimbu. Boroko: Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research,
Discussion Paper 22.
Standish, B. (1983). "They want to be the highest always": the elections in Simbu.
In D. Hegarty (Ed.), Electoral politics in Papua New Guinea: Studies on
the 1977 National Elections (pp. 75-122). Port Moresby: University of
Papua New Guinea Press.
Standish, B. (1989). "After the big one": the 1982 Chimbu Provincial campaign.
In P. King (Ed.), Pangu returns to power: the 1982 elections in Papua
New Guinea (pp. 163-204). Canberra: Australian National University.
Standish, B. (1992). Simbu path to power: Political change and cultural
continuity in the Papua New Guinea Highlands. Unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT.
Standish, B. (1994). Papua New Guinea: the search for security in a weak state. In
A. Thompson (Ed.), Papua New Guinea (pp. 51-86). Issues for Australian
security planners. Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre.
Standish, B. (1996). Elections in Simbu: Towards gunpoint democracy? In Y.
Saffu (Ed.), The 1992 PNG elections: change and continuity in electoral
politics (pp. 277-322). Political and Social Change Monograph 23.
Canberra: Australian National University.
Standish, B. (2002). Electoral governance in Papua New Guinea: Chimbu Poll
Diary, June 2002. Retrieved October 12, 2006, from
http://www .rspas. anu. edu. au/melanesia/pngresourcepage.htm
Standish, B. (2003). Papua New Guinea's most turbulent election. In Catalyst:
Social Pastoral Journalfor Melanesia, 33(2), 130-148.
Standish, B. (2006). Limited preferential voting in Papua New Guinea: some early
lessons. In Pacific Economic Bulletin, 21(1), 195-211.
Standish, B. (2007). The dynamics of Papua New Guinea's democracy: an essay.
In Pacific Economic Bulletin, 22(1), 135-157.
Stewart, P. J. and Strathern, A. (2002). Violence: theory and ethnography.
London: Continuum.

78

Strathem, A. (1977). 'Contemporary warfare in the New Guinea Highlands:
Revival or Breakdown?'. In Yagl-Ambu 4(3), 135-146.
Strathem, A. (1993a). Violence and political change in Papua New Guinea. In
Pacific Studies, 16(4), 41-61.
Strathem, A. (1993b). Voices of conflict. Ethnology Monographs No 14.
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh.
Tanim [Film]. (2003). On The Cutting Edge. Australia: SBS.
Tullkiewicz, M.S. (2006). Papua New Guinea: weak, failing, failed?: An
examination offailed state theory and the usefulness offailed state index.
Unpublished Honours dissertation, Edith Cowan University, Perth,
Western Australia.
Van Krieken, R., Smith, P., Habibis, D., McDonald, K., Haralambos, M. and
Holbom, M. (2000). Sociology. Themes and perspectives. Frenchs Forest:
Pearson Education Australia.
World Bank (2004). Papua New Guinea: Poverty assessment. Retrieved April12,
2007, from
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPAPUANEWGUINEA/Resources/
PA-Report.pdf
Yala, C. (2002). Melanesian conflicts. Australian National University, State
Society and Governance in Melanesia Project Discussion Paper 2002/4: 7-

10.
Yin, R.K. (2003). Case Study Research; Design and Methods (3rd ed.). Thousand
Oaks: Sage Publications.

Newspaper articles
. Independent, 13 June 2002, p 2 'Cash for votes feared in Highlands'
Independent, 11 July 2002, p 6 'Soldiers to boost police in trouble-tom

Highlands'
Independent, 11 July 2002, p 7 'Election violence claims more lives in Enga'
National, 1 May 2002, p 7 'All43 parties submit final lists of candidates'
National, 3 May 2002, p 3 'SHP population highest in PNG'
National, 4 June 2002, p 8 'SHP polling in June 25'
National, 4 June 2002, p 8 'Enga to vote on June 25'
National, 7 June 2002, p 5 'Forget parties, see merits: PM'

79

National, 11 June 2002, p 7 ' Rival supporters attack O'Neill in Pangia'
National, 14 June 2001, 'Portents not good for 2002 elections: Paska'
National, 25 June 2002, p ·3 '10-yr-old girl shot dead in Chimbu polling booth

riot'
National, 28 June 2002, p 1 'Chimbu declared a 'fighting zone'
National, 28 June 2002, p 3 'Election 2002- Highlands'
National, 2 July 2002, p 9 'Are we going to Africa way?'
National, 4 July2002, p 2 'Two killed in Enga poll violence'
National, 10 July2002, p 1 'Army called out. SHP declared 'fighting zone'
National, 18 July 2002, p 8 'SHP people have gone mad'
Post-Courier, 28 March 2002, p 22 'Elections start next Thursday'
Post-Courier, 4 April 2002, p 1 'PM blocks poll start'
Post-Courier, 8 April 2002, p 1 'Court throws out poll query'
Post-Courier, 16 April2002, p 1 'MP attacked: Minj crowed sets upon member at

nomination'
Post-Courier, 16 April 2002, p 2 'Over 1000 likely to contest Highlands region's

39 seats'
Post-courier, 18 April2002, p 2 'Kuli's supporters hit back'
Post-courier, 24 April 2002, p 5 'Police will be swift and assertive'
Post-Courier, 30 April2002, p 2 'MP resigns to avoid charges'
Post-Courier, 1 May 2002, p 6 'Kundiawa out of drugs'
Post-Courier, 1 May 2002, p 19 'Measles epidemic aftermath'
Post-_Courier, 8 May 2002, p 27 'Leaders accused of supplying arms'
Post-Courier, 10 May 2002, p 11 'The real costs of development failure'
Post-Courier, 20 May 2002, p 1 'Hostages taken in SHP poll campaign trail'
Post-Courier, 22 May 2002, p 1 'Get army to SHP- Diro'
Post-Courier, 24 May 2002, p 2 'MPs in gun trade- PM'
Post-Courier, 5 June 2002, p 1 'PM's roll ire'
Post-Courier, 6 June 2002, p 5 'More election petitions predicted'
Post-Courier, 7 June 2002, p 4 'Go for people in parties- PM'
Post-Courier, 11 June 2002, p 1 'K4m for polls diverted'
Post-Courier, 14 June 2002, p 1 'Two regions in polling doubt'
Post-Courier, 14 June 2002, p 3 'Aircraft warned of 'no-go' areas'
Post-Courier, 19·June 2002, p 1 'Poll chaos: two dead in Hagen'

80

Post-Courier, 19 June 2002, p 2 'Two killed at polls'
Post-Courier, 19 June 2002, p 11 'Politics, power and corruption'
Post-Courier, 20 June 2002, p 1 'Plea: stop poll or it's civil war'
Post-Courier, 21 June 2002, p 1 'Officers forced to sign papers by armed men'
Post-Courier, 24 June 2002, p 3 'Highlands death toll reaches nine'
Post-Courier, 2 July 2002, p 3 'Four more dead in election violence'
Post-Courier, 4 July 2002, p 1 'Alert for poll Dirty Dozen'
Post-Courier, 4 July 2002, p 3 'Police took sides'
Post-Courier, 5 July 2002, p 2 'SHP polls today'
Post-Courier, 10 July 2002, p 1 'Army callout'
Post-Courier, 11 July 2002, p 3 'Four shot dead in Southern Highlands'
Post-Courier, 12 July 2002 p 1 'Armed policemen 'rise up' over pay'
Post-Courier, 12 July 2002 p 3 'Enga ballots bombed'
Post-Courier, 18 July 2002, p 2 'Guns 'affordable' in Highlands'
Post-Courier, 18 July 2002, p 4 'Chimbu count suspended'
Post-Courier, 26 July 2002, pp 1-2 "Taliban' polls'
Post-Courier, 1 August 2002, pp 12-16 'Facts and figures of general election'
Post-Courier, 02 August 2002, 'Elections worst and darkest'
Post-Courier, 02 August 2002, p 2 'New elections for six SHP seats'
Post-Courier, 02 August 2002, p 11 'Some election facts'
Post-Courier, 9 August 2002, p 2 'Poll frustrations lead to calls for secession'
Post-Courier, 12 September 2002, p 11 'PNG's national security under serious

threat'
Post-Courier, 19 September 2002, p 5 'SHP has more guns than B'ville: Barter'
Post-Courier, 21 October 2002, p 1 'Thieves- Barter'

81

Appendix A - Seats won by party endorsed candidates, 2002

Party

Number of winners declared

National Alliance Party
People's Democratic Movement
People's Progress Party
Papua and Niugini Union Paty (Pangu)
People's Act~on Party
People's Labour Party
Christian Democratic Party
Melanesian Alliance Party
Papua New Guinea National Party
United Party
Nation Transformation Party
Pan Melanesian Congress Party
People's National Congress Party
People's Solidarity Party
Pipol First Party
Rural Pipol's Pati
Advance PNG Party
National Vision for Humanity Party
One People Party
PNG Country Party
PNG First Party
PNG Labour Party
PNG Revival Party
United Resources Party
Independent

19
12
8
6
5
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
17

Source: PNGEC (2006, online).
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Appendix B - Endorsed winning candidates by political party in the
Highlands

Electorates
Chimbu Provincial
Chuave Open
GumineOpen
Karimui-Nomane Open
Kerowagi Open
Kundiawa Open
Sinasina-Yonggamugl Open

Candidate
Louis Ambane
DavidAngo
NickKKuman
Posi Menaz
Alphonse M Willie
Mathew N Siune
Jeffery Nape

Party
National Alliance Party
Nation Transformation Party
Independent
Independent
National Alliance Party
People's Democratic Movement
National Alliance Party

Eastern Highlands Provincial
Daulo Open
Goroka Open
Henganofi Open
Kainantu Open
Lufa Open
Obura-Wonenara Open
Okapa Open
Unggai-Bena Open

Malcolm S Kela
Ben M Kiagi
B ire Kimisopa
Tota B Bun
Yuntuvi Bao
Yawa Silupa
John Koigiri
TomAmukele
Benny T Allan

Independent
United Party
United Party
Christian Democratic Party
People's Labour Party
National Alliance Party
People's Solidarity Party
Pipol First Party
Independent

Enga Province
Lagaip-Porgera Open
Kandep Open
Kompiam-Ambum Open
Wabag Open
Wapenamanda Open

Peter Ipatas
Yarka Kappa
Don P Pullie Polye
Dickson M Maki
Samuel T Abal
Y angakun M Kaeok

People's Democratic Movement
Independent
National Alliance Paty
PNG Country Party
People's Democratic Movement
People's Labour Party

Southern Highlands Provincial
Kagua-Erave Open
Komo-Magarina Open
Koroba-Lake Kopiago
Peter o·'Neill
Ialib.u-Pangia Open
Imbonggu Open
Mendi Open
Michael B N ali
Nipa-Kutubu Open
Robert Kopaol
Tari Open

Failed
Failed
Failed
Failed
People's Solidarity Party
Failed
People's Progress Party
People's Progress Party
Failed

Western Highlands Provincial
Angalimp-South Wahgi Open
Dei Open
Baiyer-Mul Open
Hagen Open
Jimi Open
North Wahgi Open
Tambul-NebilyerOpen

People's Democratic Movement
Christian Democratic Party
PNG National Party
Independent
!dependent
PNG National Party
PNG National Party
Christian Democratic Party

Paias Wingti
Paul WWai
Melchior Pep
Kuri Kingal
William Duma
Francis K Kinde
Michael M Kal
MarkS Anis

Sources: PNGEC, 2007, online; Post-Courier, 1 August 2002, pp 12-16.
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Appendix C - Coalition governments since 1972

Year Prime Minister

Deputy Prime Minister

Reason for change

1972
1977
1980
1982
1985
1987
1988
1992
1994
1997
1999
2002

Julius Chan (PPP)
Julius Chan (PPP)
Iambakey Okuk (NP)
Paias Wingti (PDM)
Julius Chan (PPP)
Julius Chan (PPP)
Ted Diro (PAP)
Julius Chan (PPP)
Chris Haiveta (Pangu)
Chris Haiveta (Pangu)
John Pundari (PAP)
Allan Marat (PPP)

National elections
National elections
No-confidence vote
National elections
No-confidence vote
National elections
No-confidence vote
National elections
Court ousted PM
National elections
PM resigned
National elections

Michael Somare (Pangu)
Michael Somare (Pangu)
Julius Chan (PPP)
Michael Somare (Pangu)
Paias Wingti (PDM)
Paias Wingti (PDM)
Rabbie Namaliu (Pangu)
Paias Wingti (PDM)
Julius Chan (PPP)
Bill Skates (PNC)
Mekere Morauta (PDM)
Michael Somare (NA)

Note: From 1972 the government leader Michael Somare was Chief Minister, and at Independence in
1975 the same coalition continued in office with Somare and Chan as Prime Minister and Deputy.
Key: Pangu = Pangu Pati; PPP =People's Progress Party; NP =National Party; NA =National Alliance;
PDM =People's Democratic Movement; PAP= People's Action Party; PNC =People's National
Congress

Source: Okole (2002).
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Appendix D- Census (18 years & older), Common Roll and Vote Analysis
by Province

Region

Province

2000 Census 18+

2002 Vote

Ratio

Southern
Southern
Southern
Southern
Southern
Southern

Western
Gulf
Central
NCD
Milne Bay
Northern

75 403
52 535
94 609
149 834
110 085
66 666

63 739
47 000
94 583
82 725
87 967
61295

84.53%
89.46%
99.97%
55.21%
79.91%
91.94%

Highlands
Highlands
Highlands
Highlands
Highlands

Southern Highlands
Enga
Western Highlands
Chimbu
Eastern Highlands

300 654
169 258
253 984
155 475
239 869

n/a
326 842
399 901
442 680
417 498

n/a*
193.10%
157.45%
284.73%
174.05%

Momase
Momase
Momase
Momase

Morobe
Madang
East Sepik
West Sepik

289 225
181 604
170 935
92 696

212 601
152 919
159 757
84 534

73.51%
84.20%
93.46%
91.19%

Islands
Islands
Islands
Islands
Islands

Manus
New Ireland
East New Britain
West New Britain
North Solomon

22 481
60 354
112 858
92 949
86 598

18 772
45 158
72 202
67 733
49 668

83.50%
74.82%
63.98%
72.87%
57.35%

* The Electoral Commission failed the elections in six Southern Highlands electorates
Source: PNGEC (2003).
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Appendix E - Comparison of the 1997 and 2002 vote in the Highlands
Provinces

I Province

1997 Vote

2002 vote

Ratio

Southern Highlands
Eng a
Western Highlands
Chimbu
Eastern Highlands

296 488
207 868
233 463
239 895
221 818

n/a
326 842
399 901
442 680
417 498

n/a
57.24%
71.29%
84.53%
88.22%

Total

1199 532

1586 921

75.73%

Note: There might be variations in the total increase figure due to the lack of data in SHP.

Source: PNGEC (2003).
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